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 I 
ABSTRACT 
In psychology, the abstract/concrete distinction refers to a distinction among 
concepts, which is typically characterized as follows. Concrete concepts are 
those whose referents can be experienced through sensation/perception, such 
as dog or pond, whereas abstract concepts are those whose referents lack this 
attribute, such as truth (Wiemer-Hastings & Xu, 2005; Connell & Lynott, 2012; 
Brysbaert, Warriner, & Kuperman, 2014). This thesis describes and, using word 
association, tests several theories of conceptual representation motivated by the 
abstract/concrete distinction (or, where not motivated by it, with potential 
implications related to it). These include Dual Coding Theory (Paivio, 1986, 
2007), Perceptual Symbol Systems (Barsalou, 1999, 2008), Language and 
Situated Simulations (Barsalou, Santos, Simmons, & Wilson, 2008), and Different 
Representational Frameworks (Crutch & Warrington, 2005, 2007, 2010). We find 
mixed support for Dual Coding Theory and Perceptual Symbol Systems, strong 
support for Language and Situated Simulations, and no support for Different 
Representational Frameworks. 
Keywords: abstract and concrete concepts, dual coding, language, 
representation, simulation, word association 
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CHAPTER 1 
INTRODUCTION 
 
1.1   THE ABSTRACT/CONCRETE DISTINCTION AND ITS VALUE 
When philosophers discuss the abstract/concrete distinction, they refer typically 
to a distinction among objects or entities (Rosen, 2001). Where objects like dogs 
and ponds and trees are considered concrete, those like the letter 'A' and 
Shakespeare's 'Hamlet' are considered abstract. However, there is little 
consensus on what characterizes this distinction. While a common theme is that 
abstract objects lack key attributes possessed by concrete objects, just what 
these attributes are varies by account (e.g., mentality and sensibility, or spatiality 
and causal efficacy; Rosen, 2001). By contrast, psychology draws its 
abstract/concrete distinction not among objects, but concepts. Moreover, there is 
general agreement on how the distinction should be characterized. Concrete 
concepts are those whose referents can be experienced through 
sensation/perception1, such as dog or pond or tree, whereas abstract concepts 
are those whose referents lack this attribute, such as love or truth (Paivio, Yuille, 
& Madigan, 1968; Wiemer-Hastings & Xu, 2005; Connell & Lynott, 2012; 
Brysbaert, Warriner, & Kuperman, 2014). Presumably, that this characterization 
has not proven contentious is because of the following set of circumstances: (1) 
the characterization is the basis for instructions used to obtain concept 
concreteness ratings (i.e., participants' assessments of how concrete or abstract 
a concept is; e.g., Brysbaert et al., 2014), (2) concept concreteness ratings are 
used as independent variables in studies that yield significant empirical findings, 
(3) these findings—besides being valuable to psychology in and of themselves—
are relied upon by a number of influential psychological theories (Figure 1). 
                                            
1 The word "perception" is here and elsewhere in this thesis taken to mean "nonverbal perception". 
This shortcut has become commonplace in the literature. However, it can be confusing in the context 
of a perceptual versus verbal system, as all verbal objects (e.g., words, phrases) inhere in perception. 
A similar point is made by Paivio, 2007 (p. 35, footnote 5). 
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Figure 1. Psychology's characterization of the abstract/concrete distinction is the basis for instructions 
that are used to obtain concept concreteness ratings. Concept concreteness ratings serve as 
independent variables in studies yielding significant empirical findings. These findings—besides being 
valuable to psychology in and of themselves—are import for a number of influential psychological 
theories. 
 
This thesis focuses on outlining and testing several theories of conceptual 
representation motivated by the abstract/concrete concept distinction. Some of 
these take the distinction literally, for example, by offering a view in which 
concrete, but not abstract, concepts are represented by sensory/perceptual 
experience (Paivio, 1986, 2007). Others take it less literally, for example, by 
suggesting that both abstract and concrete concepts are represented through 
sensory/perceptual experience albeit in differing manners that recapitulate the 
distinction (Barsalou, 1999, 2008). 
 
1.2   THEORIES ADDRESSING THE DISTINCTION: A LITERATURE REVIEW  
The theories covered are Dual Coding Theory (Paivio, 1986, 2007), Perceptual 
Symbol Systems (Barsalou, 1999, 2008), Language and Situated Simulations 
(Barsalou, Santos, Simmons & Wilson, 2008), and Different Representational 
Frameworks (Crutch & Warrington, 2005, 2007, 2010). Tenets and relevant 
studies for each are discussed in turn. 
 
1.2.1   DUAL CODING THEORY (DCT) 
Dual Coding Theory (Paivio, 1986, 2007) is characterized here as a theory of 
conceptual representation based on a series of nested ideas. The first and most 
general idea is that the mind contains symbolic systems, which are derived from, 
but functionally orthogonal to, sensorimotor systems (Table 1). Symbolic systems 
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Table 1. Orthogonal conceptual relations between symbolic systems and sensorimotor systems with 
examples of types of modality-specific information represented in each subsystem. Table and title 
recreated from Paivio (1986, p. 57, 2007, p. 36). 
Sensorimotor systems  Symbolic systems 
  Verbal Nonverbal 
Visual  Visual words Visual objects 
Auditory  Auditory words Environmental sounds 
Haptic  Braille, handwriting "Feel" of objects 
Gustation  — Taste memories 
Olfaction  — Smell memories 
Emotion  — Felt emotions 
 
have the general attributes of systems—that is, they consist of parts forming a 
unitary whole—but deal specifically in mental representations. The second idea 
is that, among the various symbolic systems in the mind, two are fundamental in 
the sense that they are not also symbolic subsystems (Table 1). These are the 
nonverbal and verbal systems. According to Paivio (1986, 2007), the nonverbal 
and verbal systems exhibit key differences. The most central among these is that 
the nonverbal system processes "imagens" (fundamental units of nonverbal 
information, which include, for example, geometric forms, objects, or scenes), 
whereas the verbal system processes "logogens" (fundamental units of verbal 
information, which include, for example, words, stock phrases, or memorized 
poems). Another difference relates to their evolution and development. The 
nonverbal system is evolutionarily older than, and developmentally prior to, the 
verbal system, which might in fact depend on the nonverbal system for its 
evolution (2007, p. 279) and development (1986, p. 87-90). In the quote below, 
Paivio makes explicit the functionally independent nature of the two systems. 
Note, however, that while the two systems are separable, they maintain 
referential connections, and in fact it is because of these connections, rather than 
despite them, that they avoid being made into one larger system. 
 A final question is whether it is also necessary to postulate an Aristotelian 
 common sense that is completely amodal and capable of representing all 
 sense modalities and accommodating the relation between nonverbal and 
 verbal representations—a kind of interlingua that mediates transfer from 
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 one system to the other. Such a common representational system is 
 precisely what propositional theorists propose, but dual coding theory 
 incorporates a different view. The experiential derivation of the 
 sensorimotor subsystems implies that they must be interconnected 
 because of co-occurrences in experience and yet capable of functioning 
 independently. The functional interconnections permit activation of one  
 subsystem by another. The mediating interlingua is unnecessary and 
 logically undesirable because it is unparsimonious and leads to an infinite 
 regress of mediating interlingua (Paivio, 1986, p. 58). 
The third idea—the first to address the abstract/concrete distinction—is that 
concrete concepts are represented in both the nonverbal and verbal system, 
whereas abstract concepts are represented only in the verbal system. It is at the 
level of this third idea that DCT gives rise to specific hypotheses. 
One of these hypotheses is that, because concrete concepts are represented in 
two systems and abstract concepts in one, the former are processed more 
efficiently than the latter. Evidence of this "concreteness effect" is replete in the 
literature. Experiments using lexical decision (James, 1975; Bleasdale, 1987), 
recall (Paivio, Yuille, & Smythe, 1966; Romani, McAlpine, & Martin, 2007) and 
word naming (de Groot, 1989; Schwanenflugel & Stowe, 1989) have all 
demonstrated faster and/or more accurate processing for concrete than abstract 
concepts. However, despite the apparent ubiquity of the concreteness effect, 
there are reasons for doubt. First, experiments do not always reveal the 
concreteness effect (e.g., Experiments 3 and 4 in James, 1975; control 
conditions in Papagno, Fogliata, Catricalà, & Miniussi, 2009). Second, the 
concreteness effect might not be a concreteness effect per se. For example, 
Gernsbacher (1984) found that James' (1975) lexical decision advantage for 
concrete concepts could be accounted for using familiarity ratings (i.e., 
participants' assessments of how often they see, hear, or use a concept) in place 
of concreteness ratings. Comparably, Connell and Lynott (2012) found that 
ratings of perceptual strength (i.e., participants' assessments of the extent to 
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which a concept is experienced through a given sense) are better predictors of 
lexical decision and word naming than are concreteness ratings. Third, a number 
of studies have demonstrated a reverse concreteness effect. For example, 
Pexman, Hargreaves, Edwards, Henry, and Goodyear (2007) found that 
participants were quicker to categorize abstract than concrete concepts as non-
edible, and Kousta, Vigliocco, Vinson, Andrews, and Del Campo (2011) found 
that holding imageability and context availability constant led to faster lexical 
decisions for abstract than concrete concepts (which they ultimately attributed to 
greater emotional valence of abstract concepts). 
A second hypothesis is that—because they inhere in different systems—the 
spatial distribution of neural activity differs during processing of abstract and 
concrete concepts (Holcomb, Kounios, Anderson, & West, 1999). Like the 
concreteness effect, this notion of "spatial distinctiveness" (Holcomb et al., 1999) 
receives strong support from the literature. For example, Kounios and Holcomb 
(1994) recorded event-related potentials (ERPs) while participants made lexical 
decisions on abstract and concrete concepts. Compared to abstract concepts, 
concrete concepts elicited more negative-going ERPs over the right hemisphere 
at 300-500 ms and 500-800 ms. Switching the task from lexical decision to 
concrete-abstract classification (i.e., 'is the concept concrete or abstract?') led to 
the same, but larger, effects. It also revealed greater repetition effects over the 
left hemisphere at 300-500 ms and 500-800 ms for abstract concepts, and over 
the right hemisphere at 500-800 ms for concrete concepts2. In a related study, 
Holcomb et al. (1999) recorded ERPs while participants read sentences whose 
terminal words varied in concreteness and congruency3. Compared to 
                                            
2 Note that, besides demonstrating spatial distinctiveness, these findings confirm another postulate of 
DCT, which is that the nonverbal system is associated largely with the right and/or both hemispheres, 
and the verbal system with the left hemisphere (Paivio, 1986, p. 264; 2007, p. 133). 
 
3 Some examples from Holcomb et al. (1999): 
Concrete congruent – Armed robbery implies that the thief used a weapon. 
Concrete anomalous – Armed robbery implies that the thief used a rose. 
Concrete neutral – They said it was because of the rose. 
Abstract congruent – Lisa argued that this had not been the case in one single instance. 
Abstract anomalous – Lisa argued that this had not been the case in one single fun. 
Abstract neutral – They said it was because of the fun.  
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anomalous abstract words, anomalous concrete words elicited more negative-
going ERPs over numerous, but especially anterolateral, sites at 300-500 ms and 
500-800 ms. This was also the case for abstract versus concrete neutral words. 
Functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) and repetitive transcranial 
magnetic stimulation (rTMS) offer still more evidence of spatial distinctiveness 
effects. Binder, Westbury, McKiernan, Possing, and Medler (2005) used fMRI to 
scan individuals' brains as they made lexical decisions on abstract and concrete 
concepts. Abstract concepts elicited greater activation in the left precentral gyrus, 
left inferior frontal gyrus and sulcus, and left superior temporal gyrus, whereas 
concrete concepts elicited greater activation in bilateral angular gyri, the right 
middle temporal gyrus, the left middle frontal gyrus, bilateral posterior cingulate 
gyri, and bilateral precunei. Papagno et al. (2009) applied rTMS to participants' 
scalps while they made lexical decisions on abstract and concrete concepts. 
Abstract concept decision accuracy was impaired by stimulating the left inferior 
frontal gyrus and left posterior-superior temporal gyrus, whereas concrete 
concept decision accuracy was impaired by stimulating the right posterior-
superior temporal gyrus. 
In summary, DCT (Paivio, 1986, 2007) is based on three nested ideas. The first 
idea is that the mind contains symbolic systems, which are derived from, but 
functionally orthogonal to, sensorimotor systems. The second idea is that, among 
the various symbolic systems in the mind, the verbal and nonverbal systems are 
fundamental. The third idea is that concrete concepts are represented in both the 
nonverbal and verbal system, whereas abstract concepts are represented only in 
the verbal system. It is at the level of this third idea that DCT gives rise to 
testable hypotheses, which include (1) concrete concepts being processed more 
efficiently than abstract concepts, and (2) differences in the spatial distribution of 
neural activity during processing of abstract and concrete concepts. Both 
hypotheses are supported by empirical evidence. 
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1.2.2   PERCEPTUAL SYMBOL SYSTEMS (PSS) 
Perceptual Symbol Systems (Barsalou, 1999, 2008) proposes that during 
experience, the brain's modal systems—that is, systems responsible for sense-
perception, action, and introspection—produce specific patterns of neural activity. 
Selective attention operates on these patterns to isolate important subsets from 
them. These subsets are extracted and stored in long-term memory as 
"perceptual symbols" (e.g., specific memories of black, sweet, or paw). Over 
time, related perceptual symbols congregate to form "frames". For example, 
specific memories of black may form a black frame, and specific memories of 
muzzle, paw, and tail may form a dog frame. The function of frames is to 
construct "simulations", which are top down activations of the brain's modal 
systems that reenact experiences toward some end. For example, when a dog is 
encountered and arm muscles need to be engaged to pet the dog, relevant 
frames (e.g., a dog frame) construct simulations consisting of sensorimotor 
system activation that reenacts the experience of petting. Taken together, frames 
and their simulations constitute "simulators", which are equivalent to concepts, 
and, in multitude, form a "situated simulation system". This simulation system is 
at the center of conceptual processing in both nonhumans and humans, and in 
the latter, is accompanied by a linguistic system which evolved from it as a 
means of controlling it. 
Based on this description, it is clear that PSS shares features with DCT (see also 
Paivio, 2007, p. 118). For example, both posit sensorimotor/multimodal origins to 
conceptual processing, both incorporate separate systems for processing 
nonverbal/simulative and verbal/linguistic information, and both suggest that their 
nonverbal/simulation system serves as the evolutionary and developmental 
substrate for their verbal/linguistic system (Barsalou, 1999, p. 607; Paivio, 1986, 
p. 87-90, 2007, p. 279). But, considered more deeply, PSS and DCT are rather 
different. In DCT, information captured from the brain's modal systems is 
maintained as is in conceptual representations ("...DCT representations are 
isomorphic, holistic copies of modality-specific objects and events"; Paivio, 2007, 
p. 119). By contrast, in PSS, such information is readily parsed by selective 
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attention and then integrated with other similar information before contributing to 
conceptual representations. Further, where both DCT's nonverbal and verbal 
systems partake in deep conceptual processing, PSS prioritizes in this regard its 
simulation system over what it sees as a more peripheral linguistic system 
(Barsalou, 2008, p. 622; see also upcoming discussion on Language and 
Situated Simulations). 
Consequently, PSS makes different claims than does DCT about how abstract 
and concrete concepts are represented. Compared to DCT's asymmetrical 
representation across systems, PSS suggests that both types of concepts might 
be represented in a nonverbal/simulation system (Barsalou, 1999, 2008; 
Barsalou & Wiemer-Hastings, 2005). In that case, what distinguishes abstract 
from concrete concepts are different types of simulations (Barsalou & Wiemer-
Hastings, 2005). Simulations related to abstract concepts might focus on 
introspective and setting/event properties of situations. For example, simulations 
related to 'true' might focus on "a speaker’s claim, a listener’s representation of 
the claim, and the listener’s assessment of the claim" (Barsalou & Wiemer-
Hastings, 2005, p .136). Simulations related to concrete concepts, on the other 
hand, might focus on critical objects and their properties4. For example, 
simulations related to 'dog' might focus on paw and furry. Consistent with these 
differences is the idea that abstract concept representations are more complex 
than concrete concept representations (Barsalou & Wiemer-Hastings, 2005). 
Currently, the weight of evidence for PSS comes not from its predictions about 
the abstract/concrete distinction, but more general aspects of cognition and 
perception (see Barsalou, 2008, p. 623-631). However, evidence of the former 
type is accumulating. Barsalou and Wiemer-Hastings (2005) recorded 
participants as they verbally provided characteristics of three abstract concepts, 
three concrete concepts, and three concepts intermediate in concreteness for 
one minute. Recordings were transcribed and individual statements were 
                                            
4 This claim is comparable to DCT's claim that some concrete concepts can be represented, at least 
partly, as images (Paivio, 2007, p. 120; Katz & Paivio, 1975). 
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assigned to one of five classes (and 45 subclasses): taxonomic, entity, 
introspective, setting/event, or miscellaneous. Assignment to the taxonomic class 
meant that the statement included a taxonomic relation to the concept, such as a 
subordinate (e.g., "seagulls" for the concept 'bird'). Assignment to the entity class 
meant that the statement described a property of a physical object, such as an 
external component (e.g., "beaks") or entity behavior (e.g., "chirping"). 
Assignment to the setting/event class meant that the statement described a 
property of a setting or event, such as a location (e.g., "(like) downtown areas"). 
Assignment to the introspective class meant that the statement described the 
mental state of an individual in a situation, such as an evaluation (e.g., "(can be 
like) annoying"). Assignment to the miscellaneous class meant that the statement 
was either a hesitation (e.g., "um") or a meta-comment (e.g., "and I think of") or 
that it repeated the concept or a previous statement. Analyses revealed that all 
three concept types focused on setting/event properties. However, in line with 
PSS, abstract concepts focused on setting/event and introspective properties 
more than did concrete concepts and concepts intermediate in concreteness. 
Furthermore, concrete concepts focused on entity properties more than did 
abstract concepts and concepts intermediate in concreteness. Finally, concepts 
intermediate in concreteness fell in between abstract and concrete concepts in 
their classes of focus. Wiemer-Hastings and Xu (2005) found comparable results 
in a similar study that used 18 abstract and 18 concrete concepts. 
Another study providing evidence for PSS's claims about the abstract/concrete 
distinction—and one of particular relevance to this thesis because of its reliance 
on word association—was performed by Marques and Nunes (2012). In 
Experiment 1, word association pairs were selected from the University of South 
Florida free association norms (Nelson, McEvoy, & Schreiber, 1998; more on this 
in Section 2.2.1). Word association pairs are stimulus-response pairs (e.g., dog-
paw) generated by presenting individuals with a stimulus word (e.g., dog) and 
instructing them to provide a response word (e.g., paw) (more on this in Sections 
2.1 and 2.2.1). The particular word association pairs that were selected were the 
two most commonly produced pairs for each of 47 abstract and 47 concrete 
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concepts (which served as stimulus words and were all nouns). Three 
independent coders assigned each word association pair to one of the following 
three classes based on the relationship of its stimulus and response words: 
linguistic, taxonomic, or object-situation. Assignment to the linguistic class meant 
that the response word was linguistically related to the stimulus word. For 
example, bee ® hive, where the stimulus word and response word form a 
forward compound continuation. Assignment to the taxonomic class meant that 
the response word was taxonomically but not linguistically related to the stimulus 
word. For example, dog ® animal, where the response word is a superordinate 
of the stimulus word. Assignment to the object-situation class meant that the 
response word was either a property or thematic/situational associate of the 
stimulus word that was not linguistically or taxonomically related to it. For 
example, bee ® wings, where the response word is a property of the stimulus 
word. Furthermore, linguistic word association pairs were considered to come 
from a language-based system (akin to DCT's verbal system and PSS's linguistic 
system), and object-situation word association pairs were considered to come 
from a sensorimotor-based system (akin to DCT's verbal system and PSS's 
simulation system). Analyses of the codings revealed that object-situation word 
association pairs were produced with equal frequency for abstract and concrete 
concepts. Therefore, the authors concluded that abstract concepts are indeed 
represented in a sensorimotor-based (i.e., nonverbal/simulation) system—
consistent with PSS, but not DCT. However, further analyses revealed that (1) 
linguistic word association pairs were produced more frequently for abstract than 
concrete concepts, and (2) linguistic word association pairs were produced more 
frequently than object-situation word association pairs for abstract concepts. Both 
of these findings clearly accord with DCT's claim about asymmetrical 
representation. All findings were replicated in Experiment 2, which used the 
same concepts (i.e., stimulus words) alongside newly collected response words. 
While findings of the sort above are consistent with what PSS claims about 
abstract and concrete concept simulation, they provide no guarantee that 
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simulation is in fact taking place. In theory, linguistic processing might be 
responsible for all or part of the observed results. This possibility is especially 
problematic for what PSS claims about abstract concepts, as there is little doubt 
that concrete concepts undergo nonlinguistic processing (the picture-word 
priming literature attests to this, e.g., Vanderwart, 1984). Accordingly, some 
recent studies have been aimed at examining the relationship between abstract 
concepts and nonlinguistic processing. For example, Wilson-Mendenhall, 
Simmons, Martin, and Barsalou (2013) had participants perform a concept-scene 
matching task involving abstract and concrete concepts while fMRI searched for 
activity in brain regions presumed responsible for nonlinguistic processing of 
those concepts. Such activity was indeed discovered for not only concrete but 
also abstract concepts. Another example comes from McRae, Nedjadrasul, Pau, 
Lo, and King (2017), who relied on picture-word and word-picture priming. In 
Experiment 1, participants made lexical decisions on abstract words that were 
preceded by either related or unrelated pictures of situations (e.g., 'share' 
preceded by a picture of two girls sharing a corn cob. Decision latencies for 
abstract words were shorter following related than unrelated pictures5. In the 
second experiment, participants made normalcy decisions (i.e., 'yes, normal' 
versus 'no, abnormal') to pictures depicting situations that were preceded by 
either related or unrelated words (e.g., two girls sharing a corn cob preceded by 
'share'). Decision latencies for pictures depicting situations were shorter following 
related than unrelated abstract words. Presumably, because the individual 
elements appearing in the situation pictures (e.g., a corn cob) had no obvious 
semantic relations with the abstract words (e.g., 'share'), the results were not due 
to a mediation process (i.e., Paivio, 2007, p. 101-102) where, for example, 
abstract words (e.g., 'danger') activate concrete words (e.g., 'highway') that 
activate concrete nonverbal information (e.g., an image of a road sign) that leads 
to a response. Instead, it appears that abstract concepts are grounded directly in 
nonverbal information—consistent with PSS-style simulation. 
                                            
5 Note, this was the case when pictures were presented for 1000 but not 500 ms. The authors suggest 
that because pictures of situations are complex, time is required to process them. 
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In summary, PSS (Barsalou, 1999, 2008; Barsalou & Wiemer-Hastings, 2005) 
suggests that a simulation system is at the center of conceptual processing. 
Consequently, PSS makes different claims than does DCT about how abstract 
and concrete concepts are represented. Compared to DCT's asymmetrical 
representation across systems, PSS suggests that both types of concepts might 
be represented in a nonverbal/simulation system. In that case, what distinguishes 
abstract from concrete concepts are different types of simulations. Simulations 
related to abstract concepts might focus on introspective and setting/event 
properties of situations. In contrast, simulations related to concrete concepts 
might focus on critical objects and their properties. Empirical evidence supports 
(1) the existence of the simulation system, (2) the idea that the simulation system 
accounts for both abstract and concrete concepts, and (3) the idea that 
simulations related to abstract concepts focus on introspective and setting/event 
properties, whereas those related to concrete concepts focus on critical objects 
and their properties. 
 
1.2.3   LANGUAGE AND SITUATED SIMULATIONS (LASS) 
Language and Situated Simulations (Barsalou et al., 2008), rather than being a 
completely novel theory, extends PSS by explicating the role of the linguistic 
system. Note, however, that unlike PSS (and DCT and theories discussed later 
on), LASS is not directly motivated by the abstract/concrete distinction. We 
include it because of its connection to PSS and because it may have 
undiscovered implications related to the distinction (which we test). Borghi et al. 
(2017) make a similar observation: 
 LASS theory is not specifically aimed at explaining abstract concepts. In 
 principle, one could conclude from its principles that, while concrete 
 concepts activate the simulation system, abstract concepts activate the 
 linguistic one. However, this conclusion is not proposed by the LASS, 
 even if [it] is consistent with its principles (Borghi et al., 2017, p. 275). 
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According to LASS, as a word is perceived (e.g., walnut), the linguistic system is 
activated in order to categorize the word's linguistic form (e.g., the auditory or 
visual instantiation of 'walnut'). As the linguistic form is categorized, it sets off a 
cascade of related and largely concurrent events. Depending on the task at 
hand, these may include simulation system activation intended to represent the 
linguistic form's deeper meaning (e.g., 'walnut' ® someone cracking a walnut) as 
well as production of associated linguistic forms (e.g., 'walnut' ® 'acorn'), which 
may also engage the simulation system (e.g., 'acorn' ® a squirrel eating an 
acorn). There are two empirically important suggestions here. The first is that 
linguistic system activity peaks before simulation system activity when cues are 
words (Figure 2). This idea receives support from a study by Santos, Chaigneau, 
Simmons, and Barsalou (2011), which is discussed below. The second 
suggestion is that linguistic processing works on linguistic forms—e.g., spoken or 
written words—devoid of their perceptual referents, which are instead processed 
in the simulation system. In other words, linguistic processing is relatively 
superficial. Barsalou et al. (2008) point to work on lexical processing as evidence 
for this suggestion (p. 249-250). Note also that the description above concerns 
single word perception. When cues are phrases or sentences, the complexity of 
linguistic processing, simulations, and their interplay increases dramatically 
(Barsalou et al., 2008). 
 
 
Figure 2. Linguistic system (L) activity precedes situated simulation system (SS) activity when 
conceptual processing is cued by words. Figure recreated from Barsalou et al. (2008, p. 248). 
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Evidence for LASS comes mainly from Santos et al. (2011), and relates to its 
time course predictions. In Experiment 1, participants were shown stimulus 
words and asked to provide response words based on what came to mind (i.e., 
they performed word association—specifically, continuous association; more on 
this in Sections 2.1 and 2.2.1). For example, shown the word 'dog', they may 
have responded 'animal' then 'cat' then 'terrier'. Response words were recorded 
and then assigned to one of three classes (and ten subclasses) based on their 
relationship with their stimulus word: linguistic, taxonomic, or object-situation6. 
Assignment to the linguistic class meant that the response word was linguistically 
related to the stimulus word. For example, bee ® hive, where the stimulus word 
and response word form a forward compound continuation. Assignment to the 
taxonomic class meant that the response word was taxonomically, but not 
linguistically, related to the stimulus word. For example, dog ® animal, where the 
response word is a superordinate of the stimulus word. Assignment to the object-
situation class meant that the response word was either a property or situational 
associate of the stimulus word that was not linguistically or taxonomically related 
to it. For example, bee ® wings, where the response word is a property of the 
stimulus word. Santos et al. analyzed response word positions (i.e., whether they 
were the first, second, third, etc. response word given) and response word 
classes. Linguistic response words (average response position of 1.61) preceded 
taxonomic response words (average response position of 2.03), which preceded 
object-situation response words (average response position of 2.47), verifying 
LASS's claim that linguistic system activity peaks prior to simulation system 
activity when cues are words. Worth noting is that taxonomic response words 
occupy a middle position between linguistic and object-situation response words. 
This implies that the linguistic and simulation system are co-responsible for them. 
In Experiment 2, participants performed a property generation task, which yielded 
results similar to Santos et al.'s Experiment 1. 
                                            
6 This procedure was essentially the same as the earlier described procedure used by Marques and 
Nunes (2012). We choose to redescribe it here. 
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In summary, LASS (Barsalou et al., 2008) extends PSS by explicating the role of 
the linguistic system. In doing so, it makes two important suggestions. The first is 
that linguistic system activity peaks before simulation system activity when cues 
are words. The second is that the linguistic system works on linguistic forms 
devoid of their perceptual referents, which are instead processed in the 
simulation system. Both of these suggestions receive empirical support. 
 
1.2.4   DIFFERENT REPRESENTATIONAL FRAMEWORKS (DRF) 
Different Representational Frameworks (Crutch & Warrington, 2005, 2007, 2010) 
departs from the theories discussed so far in several ways. First, it is best 
characterized as a theory about abstract/concrete concept representation, rather 
than one that relies on abstract/concrete concept representation to substantiate 
more general claims about, for example, between-system (DCT) or within-system 
(PSS) mechanics of conceptual processing. Second, it proposes that different 
organizations—rather than distributions across systems (DCT) or simulations 
(PSS)—are what is responsible for differences in abstract and concrete concept 
representations. Specifically, whereas abstract concept representations are 
organized by semantic association, concrete ones are organized by semantic 
similarity. Third, it makes no assumptions about whether a single or multiple 
systems are involved in representing concepts; "in stipulating the importance of 
different types of representation, we have made no suggestion that these 
necessarily constitute separate systems" (Crutch & Warrington, 2010, p. 68). 
Fourth, it does not explicitly incorporate nonverbal/simulation-type and/or 
verbal/linguistic-type systems at all, although it does not rule them out (Crutch & 
Warrington, 2010): 
 ...this hypothesis is not entirely incompatible with previous theories, 
 particularly if, for example, the dual-coding theory’s “verbal system” was 
 reframed as an associative representational structure, and the sensory 
 system was reframed as representations of similarity-based information 
 (Crutch & Warrington, 2010, p. 47). 
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DRF's main claim is that "abstract words have a relatively greater dependence 
than concrete words upon representations of semantic association and that 
concrete words have a relatively greater dependence than abstract words upon 
representations of similarity-based information" (Crutch & Warrington, 2010, p. 
47). Figure 3 depicts two possible relationships between concreteness and 
similarity/association consistent with this claim (Crutch & Warrington, 2010). In 
both cases, concreteness is positively correlated with semantic similarity, and 
negatively correlated with semantic association. 
 
 
Figure 3. Two possible relationships between concreteness and semantic similarity/association 
consistent with DRF. Figure recreated from Crutch & Warrington (2010, p. 48). 
 
Evidence for DRF comes largely from a series of neuropsychological studies by 
Crutch and Warrington. The first of these studies (Crutch & Warrington, 2005) 
utilized a semantic refractory access dysphasia patient on the premise that they 
would exhibit semantic interference effects due to a "sensitivity to the semantic 
relatedness of test stimuli" (Crutch & Warrington, 2005, p. 616). In Experiment 4 
of the study, the patient was presented with arrays of (1A) semantically similar 
abstract words (e.g., array 1: boil, heat, cook, fry; array 2: look, peek, glance, 
see), (1B) controls produced by reorganizing words from across 1A arrays (e.g., 
array 1: boil, look, gale, clean; array 2: heat, peek, wind, eat), (2A) semantically 
similar concrete words (e.g., array 1: goose, crow, sparrow, pigeon; array 2: 
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cardigan, jacket, blouse, pullover), and (2B) controls produced by reorganizing 
words from across 2A arrays (e.g., array 1: goose, melon, pullover, biscuit; array 
2: banana, cardigan, pizza, sparrow). As words from a given array were spoken 
by the experimenter, the patient was required to point to their written 
instantiations, until all words in the array had been spoken. Results revealed 
decreased correct responding for concrete, but not abstract, arrays as compared 
to controls, confirming one half of DRF's claim. Moreover, error rates increased 
with successive spoken words in all trials, implying a build-up of semantic 
interference. Experiment 5 used the same procedure as Experiment 4, except 
with test arrays organized by semantic association instead of semantic similarity, 
e.g., abstract: exercise, healthy, fitness, jogging; concrete: farm, cow, tractor, 
barn. Results revealed decreased correct responding for abstract, but not 
concrete, arrays compared to controls, confirming the other half of DRF's claim. 
A second neuropsychological study (Crutch & Warrington, 2007) tested a patient 
with deep-phonological dyslexia. Here, the patient was required to read arrays of 
concepts organized in a fashion similar to the previous study. Results again 
revealed an effect of semantic similarity upon processing of concrete, but not 
abstract, concepts, and an effect of semantic association upon processing of 
abstract, but not concrete, concepts. Notably, the effect here was a facilitation, 
rather than interference, effect. A third neuropsychological study (Crutch & 
Warrington, 2010) replicated the results from the previous two studies—i.e., 
interference during spoken word-written word matching and facilitation during 
word reading—with a global aphasic patient. DRF's claims have also been 
confirmed outside of neuropsychology. For example, using a visual world 
paradigm, Duñabeitia, Avilés, Afonso, Scheepers, and Carreiras (2009) found 
that abstract words draw more and quicker attention to pictures of semantically 
dissimilar associates (e.g., smell ® picture of a nose) than do concrete words 
(e.g., crib ® picture of a baby). 
But despite the summarized findings, a number of studies have also failed to 
support DRF (e.g., Marques & Nunes, 2012; Zhang, Han, & Bi, 2013; Hill, 
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Korhonen, & Bentz, 2014; Benko, 2015; Ferré, Guasch, García-Chico, & 
Sánchez-Casas, 2015). Among these, the aforementioned study by Marques and 
Nunes (2012) as well as a study by Hill et al. (2014)—because of their reliance 
on word association—are uniquely relevant to this thesis. 
In Marques and Nunes' (2012) study, word association pairs were selected from 
the University of South Florida free association norms (Nelson et al., 1998). The 
particular word association pairs that were selected were the two most commonly 
produced pairs for each of 47 abstract and 47 concrete concepts (which served 
as stimulus words and were all nouns). Analyses performed on these pairs 
revealed that they more often exhibited semantic similarity (i.e., contained 
"synonyms, superordinates, category coordinates, and subordinates") when 
produced for abstract than concrete concepts, which is the exact opposite of 
what DRF predicts. Analyses also revealed that pairs more often exhibited 
semantic association (i.e., contained "thematic or situational associates and 
forward and backward completions") when produced for concrete than abstract 
concepts, again contradicting DRF. These results were replicated in a second 
experiment, which used the same concepts (i.e., stimulus words) alongside 
newly collected response words.  
In Hill et al.'s (2014) study, word association pairs and their forward association 
probabilities were taken from the University of South Florida free association 
norms (Nelson et al., 1998). Forward association probabilities (also known as 
forward cue-to-target strengths) are probabilities of generating a given response 
word from a given stimulus word (more on this in Section 2.1). Each word 
association pair was assigned a score that reflected the semantic similarity of its 
stimulus and response words (based on their proximity in WordNet; Felbaum, 
1998). A multiple regression with forward association probability as a dependent 
variable, and stimulus word concreteness rating, semantic similarity score, and 
their interaction as predictors was conducted to test the following DRF-inspired 
prediction: 
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 If concrete concepts are organized in the mind to a greater extent than 
 abstract concepts according to similarity, then the associates of a given 
 concrete concept should be more similar to that concept than the 
 associates of a given abstract concept (Hill et al., 2014, p. 167-168). 
What this prediction says, in other words, is that semantic similarity scores and 
forward association probabilities should pattern more similarly for a concrete 
stimulus word and its response words than for an abstract stimulus word and its 
response words. 
Both semantic similarity and the interaction were significant positive predictors of 
forward association probability. However, because the interaction accounted for 
only a very minimal amount of variance in forward association probability over 
semantic similarity alone (i.e., less than 0.1%), the authors decided there was 
insufficient evidence for their prediction. That is, concrete concepts were not 
found to be more similar to their associates than abstract concepts. 
In summary, DRF (Crutch & Warrington, 2005, 2007, 2010) departs from DCT 
and PSS in several ways. For example, it is best characterized as a theory about 
abstract/concrete concept representation, rather than one that relies on 
abstract/concrete concept representation to substantiate more general claims. 
DRF's main claim is that "abstract words have a relatively greater dependence 
than concrete words upon representations of semantic association and that 
concrete words have a relatively greater dependence than abstract words upon 
representations of similarity-based information" (Crutch & Warrington, 2010, p. 
47). There exists empirical evidence both for and against this claim. 
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CHAPTER 2 
USING WORD ASSOCIATION 
 
2.1   WHY WE USE WORD ASSOCIATION 
In word association, a stimulus word is presented to an individual who must then 
provide, based on what comes to mind, a response word (Jung, 1969; Nelson et 
al., 1998). For example, presented with 'walnut', an individual may respond 
'acorn'. Because stimulus and response words are often conceptually—and not 
just associatively—related (McRae, Khalkhali, & Hare, 2012), word association 
may provide insight into how concepts are represented. Yet little work has drawn 
upon it in examining the abstract/concrete distinction. 
The present study uses word association to test hypotheses related to the 
abstract/concrete distinction, each derived from one of the four theories 
discussed in Chapter 1. In doing so, it assumes—like the earlier discussed 
studies by Marques and Nunes (2012) and Hill et al. (2014)—that population-
level word association statistics reflect how concepts are represented within 
individuals. It is unknown to what extent this assumption is justified, but word 
association statistics collected from populations have been found to correlate 
highly with those collected from individuals (Cofer, 1958). 
 
2.2   HOW WE USE WORD ASSOCIATION 
2.2.1   WORD ASSOCIATION PAIRS AND CONCEPTS 
We relied on the University of South Florida Free Association norms (Nelson et 
al., 1998) for our word association data. The USF norms contain 5,019 stimulus 
words with roughly 750,000 associated response words. To obtain these data, 
over 6,000 participants performed a specific type of word association known as 
discrete association, which receives its name from the fact that participants 
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provide only a single response word to each stimulus word (Nelson et al., 1998)7. 
In Nelson et al.'s (1998) discrete association task, participants were required to 
"write the first word that came to mind that was meaningfully related or strongly 
associated to the presented word". 
The USF collection includes approximately thirty types of data, which are made 
available for all stimulus-response pairs—henceforth referred to as word 
association pairs—produced by at least two participants. The two-participant 
criterion was selected because idiosyncratic pairs are highly unreliable (Nelson et 
al., 1998). The present study uses the following five pieces of data: (1) cue8, 
which refers to the stimulus word, e.g., walnut-acorn; (2) target, which refers to 
the response word, e.g., walnut-acorn; (3) group size, which refers to the number 
of participants presented with the stimulus word, e.g., 147 participants were 
shown walnut; (4) forward cue-to-target strength (FSG), which refers to the 
quotient obtained from dividing the number of participants who produced the 
response word of the pair under consideration by its "group size", e.g., shown 
walnut, 2 (out of 147) participants wrote acorn, therefore the FSG of walnut-acorn 
is 2/147 = .014; and (5) cue part-of-speech, which refers to the dominant or only 
part of speech to which the stimulus word belongs, e.g., walnut is a noun. 
We collected these data for 1764 word association pairs spanning 38 very 
abstract, 37 abstract, and 37 concrete concepts (i.e., cues; see Appendix A and 
B). The purpose of including two levels of abstract concepts was two-fold. First, 
we wanted to ensure adequate separation between abstract and concrete 
concepts, while at the same time covering a broad range of concreteness ratings. 
Had we included only an abstract and concrete group, we would risk missing an 
effect due to potentially inadequate separation between our abstract and 
concrete groups. Had we included only a very abstract and concrete group, we 
                                            
7 Discrete association is contrasted with continuous association, which has independent participants 
produce multiple responses to stimulus words (e.g., Santos et al., 2011). Continuous association can 
be problematic when subsequent responses are based on previous responses rather than on the 
stimulus word (i.e., "response chaining"; Nelson, McEvoy, & Dennis, 2000). 
 
8 "Cues" are cues to concepts. Therefore, we use the terms "cue" and "concept" interchangeably. 
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would be ignoring a large range of medium concreteness concepts. Second, we 
reasoned that we may gain insight into the two-factor model of abstractness 
(Wiemer-Hastings, Krug, & Xu, 2001), which says that: 
 First, entities are abstract or concrete, depending on whether they are 
 physical in nature (i.e., perceivable through vision, touch, etc.). Second, 
 within these groups, abstractness varies according to more specific types 
 of information (Wiemer-Hastings et al., 2001, p. 1134). 
Evidence points to this model applying principally to abstract concepts, whose 
abstractness appears to vary according to introspective information (Wiemer-
Hastings et al., 2001). That is, abstract concepts that are more abstract appear to 
be less constrained by introspective information. 
To determine which specific concepts we would collect data for, we used two 
separate procedures; one for very abstract/abstract concepts and another for 
concrete concepts. Very abstract and abstract concepts began as a single group 
of concepts. These concepts were randomly selected from the USF database 
and then cross-referenced with Brysbaert et al. (2014) to ensure they had 
concreteness scores lower than 3.3 (out of max 5). We avoided concepts whose 
meanings we intuitively felt people might be unsure of. To create separate very 
abstract and abstract groups, we split the 75 concepts we collected based on 
their median concreteness score. This produced 38 very abstract concepts with 
concreteness scores from 1.25 to 2.13, and 37 abstract concepts with 
concreteness scores from 2.17 to 3.24. 
Initially, we had planned to conduct supplementary analyses using the McRae, 
Cree, Seidenberg, and McNorgan norms (2005), and so our concrete concepts 
were chosen from across the various categories in those norms (e.g., animals, 
tools), with the constraint that they appear in the Nelson et al. (1998) norms. In 
one case, a plural form of a concept was selected from the McRae et al. (2005) 
norms but appeared only in its singular form in the Nelson et al. (1998) norms 
(i.e., boot). The concept was retained. This procedure worked out well as McRae 
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et al. (2005) items tended to have high concreteness ratings, ensuring adequate 
separation from the abstract group. We collected a total of 34 concepts from the 
McRae et al. (2005) norms. To reach 37 concepts, three more were randomly 
selected from Nelson et al. (1998) and cross-referenced with Brysbaert et al. 
(2014) to ensure they had concreteness scores above 4 (max 5). Concreteness 
scores for our concrete concepts ranged from 4.11 to 5.00. 
We compared our groups of concepts on several measures using univariate 
analyses with concept type (i.e., very abstract, abstract, and concrete) as a 
between-subjects factor. These included: group size, ln(frequency), familiarity 
ratings, and imageability ratings. A concept's group size refers to the number of 
participants that were presented with it in Nelson et al.'s (1998) word association 
norms. A concept's ln(frequency) refers to the natural logarithm of its number of 
occurrences in a given corpus—in this case, the SUBTLEXUS corpus, which 
consists of 51 million words drawn from the subtitles of over 8000 movies and 
television shows (Brysbaert & New, 2009). A concept's familiarity refers to 
participants' assessments about how often it is seen, heard, or used (Gilhooly & 
Logie, 1980). Familiarity ratings were taken from the MRC psycholinguistic 
database (Coltheart, 1981). A concept's imageability refers to participants' 
assessments of the ease/difficulty with which the concept evokes a mental image 
such as a picture or sound (Paivio et al., 1968). Imageability ratings were taken 
from the MRC psycholinguistic database (Coltheart, 1981). Analyses of group 
size and ln(frequency) were based on all 112 concepts. Analyses of familiarity 
and imageability were based on the 106 and 107 concepts for which the MRC 
database contained familiarity and imageability ratings, respectively. Main effects 
indicating differences among concept types were found for ln(frequency), 
familiarity, and imageability, but not group size (Table 2). 
Table 2. Results from univariate analyses conducted on several measures related to our concepts 
Effect df F p 
Group Size 2, 109 1.575 .212 
ln(frequency) 2, 109 **10.968 .000 
Familiarity 2, 103 **5.717 .004 
Imageability 2, 104 **189.950 .000 
Note. * = p < .05, ** = p < .01    
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The main effect of concept type on ln(frequency) was assessed with LSD tests. 
Concrete concepts (M = 6.297, SE = 1.398) were less frequent than very abstract 
concepts (M = 7.494, SE = 1.596), p = .001, and abstract concepts (M = 7.852, 
SE = 1.486), p < .001. Very abstract and abstract concepts did not differ, p = 
.302. We save the implications of these findings for the General Discussion. 
The main effect of concept type on familiarity was also assessed with LSD tests. 
Concrete concepts (M = 531.147, SE = 49.047) were rated as less familiar than 
very abstract concepts (M = 550.541, SE = 29.064), p = .028, and abstract 
concepts (M = 560.514, SE = 28.994), p = .001. We save the implications of 
these findings for the General Discussion. However, note that the difference in 
familiarity between concrete concepts and the two sets of abstract concepts was 
small; approximately 20 to 30 on a 700-point scale. In addition, all three concepts 
types produced generally high ratings. In fact, the least familiar words used in our 
study were canoe and saxophone. Therefore, it appears that participants were 
quite familiar with all 112 concepts, as intended. Very abstract and abstract 
concepts did not differ in familiarity, p = .251. 
The main effect of concept type on imageability was also assessed with LSD 
tests. Concrete concepts (M = 604.735, SE = 26.513) were rated as more 
imageable than both very abstract concepts (M = 341.946, SE = 58.676), p < 
.001, and abstract concepts (M = 398.694, SE = 79.110), p < .001. Furthermore, 
abstract concepts were rated as more imageable than very abstract concepts, p 
< .001. The main effect of concept type on imageability was expected because 
concreteness and imageability ratings tend to be correlated, as was the case with 
our data, r = .875, p < .001. In fact, both have been used in past research to 
distinguish between abstract and concrete concepts (e.g., Binder et al., 2005). 
We also examined how parts of speech were distributed within our three concept 
types. Among our 38 very abstract concepts, 14 were nouns, 8 were verbs, and 
16 were adjectives. Among our 37 abstract concepts, 15 were nouns, 8 were 
verbs, 13 were adjectives, and 1 was an adverb. Among our 37 concrete 
  
25 
concepts, 36 were nouns and 1 was a verb. These distributions appear to mirror,  
at least roughly, natural distributions of parts of speech across levels of 
concreteness. We save the implications of these findings for the General 
Discussion. 
 
2.2.2   CLASSES, SYSTEMS, AND TYPES OF RELATIONS 
Using a scheme modified from Wu and Barsalou (2009; Appendix C), two 
independent coders assigned each word association pair to one of the following 
"classes" based on the relationship between its cue and target (see Appendix B): 
categorical, entity-based, introspective, lexical, or situational. The categorical 
class contained word association pairs in which targets were categorically related 
to the cue in various ways. This included, for example, superordinates as in 
'drum-instrument', or categorical coordinates as in 'walnut-acorn'. The entity-
based class contained pairs in which targets were concrete entity properties of 
cues. This included, for example, external surface properties as in 'bed-soft', or 
internal components as in 'apple-core'. The introspective class contained pairs in 
which targets were mental states related to cues. This included, for example, 
emotional states as in 'relief-happy', or evaluations as in 'challenge-difficult'. The 
lexical class contained pairs in which targets were purely lexical associates of 
cues. This included, for example, morphological associates as in 'luck-lucky', or 
forward compound continuations as in 'relief-fund'. Finally, the situational class 
contained pairs in which targets were related to cues through situations or types 
of events. This included, for example, actions as in 'crisis-cry', or people as in 
'advice-mother'. Coders had the option of skipping word association pairs if they 
felt that the scheme did not accommodate them. 
A third coder resolved discrepancies between the two initial coders, and provided 
class assignments for any word association pairs that were skipped. The third 
coder then reviewed all resolved assignments and made any changes that were 
considered necessary. Of the 1764 resolved assignments, 363 were changed 
before being finalized. In this way, assignments were ultimately up to the third 
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coder's discretion, although they may have been inspired by the initial coders. 
We use classes primarily to test predictions based on PSS, which follows from 
earlier work having done so successfully in conjunction with both property 
generation (e.g., Barsalou & Wiemer-Hastings, 2005; Wiemer-Hastings & Xu, 
2005) and word association (Marques & Nunes, 2012). Additionally, we use 
classes as shortcuts for assigning word association pairs to DCT and PSS/LASS 
systems, which we discuss next.  
Each word association pair was assigned to the nonverbal/simulation system, 
verbal/linguistic system, or both. Note that DCT and PSS/LASS systems were 
combined because we assumed that the nonverbal and simulation systems as 
well as the verbal and linguistic systems would give rise to equivalent word 
association pairs. Marques and Nunes (2012) make a similar assumption when 
discussing their results (p. 1273). We feel this is a natural assumption, given that 
both the nonverbal and simulation systems process sensorimotor/perceptual 
information, and both the verbal and linguistic systems process language-based 
information. 
Initially, assignments of word association pairs to systems were based on 
experimenter intuition about which systems were responsible for the production 
of their targets9. Because we assumed overlap between classes and systems, 
assignments were made using the following rules/shortcuts: (1) categorical word 
association pairs belong to the verbal/linguistic system, (2) entity-based word 
association pairs belong to the nonverbal/simulation system, (3) introspective 
word association pairs belong to the nonverbal/simulation system, (4) lexical 
word association pairs belong to the verbal/linguistic system, and (5) situational 
word association pairs belong to the nonverbal/simulation system. We later 
decided to generate a second, more empirical, set of assignments that 
considered Santos et al.'s (2011) finding in which taxonomic (i.e., categorical) 
                                            
9 When we say that a system is responsible for a target, we mean that it is the system primarily 
responsible for the choice of the target, not the last system to be active prior to the response. All 
targets, because they are words, must ultimately pass through the verbal/linguistic system. However, 
that does not mean that the verbal/linguistic system is always the main determinant of the target. 
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target positions on a continuous word association task fell halfway between 
linguistic (i.e., lexical) and object-situation (i.e., entity-based and situational) 
target positions. Here, assignments were made using these rules/shortcuts 
instead: (1) categorical word association pairs belong equally to both systems, 
(2) entity-based word association pairs belong to the nonverbal/simulation 
system, (3) introspective word association pairs belong to the 
nonverbal/simulation system, (4) lexical word association pairs belong to the 
verbal/linguistic system, and (5) situational word association pairs belong to the 
nonverbal/simulation system. We considered dropping our intuition-based 
assignments and analyzing only the more empirical Santos-based assignments. 
However, because the two sets differed in only one respect (i.e., how categorical 
word pairs were treated), they could be easily contrasted, and so we decided to 
analyze both. Therefore, we make a distinction between systemsantos and 
systemintuit. We use systems to test predictions based on DCT, PSS, and LASS, 
which follows from earlier work having done so successfully (Marques and 
Nunes, 2012; Santos et al., 2011). 
Finally, each word association pair was labeled according to the semantic 
relation of its cue and target (i.e., "type of relation"; see Appendix B) which could 
be either semantically similar (i.e., cues and targets have similar meanings), or 
semantically associated (i.e., cues and targets have different but associated 
meanings). These labels relied on the subclasses in the scheme modified from 
Wu and Barsalou (2009; see Appendix C). Inspired by Crutch and Warrington's 
(2005, 2007) stimuli, we labeled word association pairs with synonymous, similar, 
and coordinate cues and targets as semantically similar, and all other word 
association pairs as semantically associated. Note that, unlike Marques and 
Nunes (2012), we did not label pairs with subordinate or superordinate cues and 
targets as semantically similar. We felt that Crutch and Warrington's stimuli 
(2005, 2007) gave little indication to do so. We use types of relation to test 
predictions based on DRF, which follows from earlier work having done so 
successfully (e.g., Crutch & Warrington, 2005, 2007, 2010). 
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2.2.3   DEPENDENT VARIABLES 
There were two main dependent variables in our study. The first was the number 
of unique word association pairs assigned to a given class, system, or type of 
relation, produced for a given concept, with the constraint that only pairs 
produced by at least two participants were considered. Two different procedures 
were used to obtain this variable depending on whether unique word association 
pairs under consideration were assigned to a given (1) class, systemintuit, or type 
of relation, or (2) systemsantos. The procedure for obtaining numbers of unique 
word association pairs assigned to a given class, systemintuit, or type of relation 
produced for a given concept consisted simply of counting them. For example, 
there were eight unique word association pairs assigned to the categorical class 
(in short, eight unique categorical word association pairs) produced for 'walnut'. 
The procedure for obtaining numbers of unique word association pairs assigned 
to a given systemsantos was more involved. First, we counted the number of 
unique non-categorical word association pairs assigned to a given systemsantos 
produced for a given concept. For example, seven unique non-categorical word 
association pairs assigned to the nonverbal/simulationsantos system were 
produced for 'walnut'. Then, we counted the number of unique categorical word 
association pairs assigned to that same systemsantos produced for that same 
concept, and divided this value by two (i.e., to reflect partial dependence on each 
system, as per section 2.2.2). For example, eight unique categorical word 
association pairs assigned to the nonverbal/simulationsantos system were 
produced for 'walnut', which divided by two, equals four such pairs. Finally, we 
summed the non-categorical and categorical pairs. For example, seven plus four 
equals eleven unique word association pairs assigned to 
nonverbal/simulationsantos system (in short, eleven unique 
nonverbal/simulationsantos word association pairs) produced for 'walnut'. 
The second dependent variable was the proportion of participants who produced 
word association pairs assigned to a given class, system, or type of relation, for a 
given concept, with the constraint that only pairs produced by at least two 
participants were considered. As with the first dependent variable, two different 
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procedures were used to obtain this variable depending on whether word 
association pairs under consideration were assigned to a given (1) class, 
systemintuit, or type of relation, or (2) systemsantos. The procedure for obtaining the 
proportion of participants who produced word association pairs assigned to a 
given class, systemintuit, or type of relation, for a given concept, consisted of 
summing appropriate FSGs. For example, the three unique word association 
pairs assigned to the entity-based class produced for 'walnut' had FSGs of .02, 
.014, and .014 = .048, indicating that 4.8% of participants produced word 
association pairs assigned to the entity-based class for 'walnut' (in short, 4.8% of 
participants produced entity-based word association pairs for 'walnut'). The 
procedure for obtaining the proportion of participants who produced word 
association pairs assigned to a given systemsantos for a given concept was more 
involved. First, we summed the FSGs of unique non-categorical word association 
pairs assigned to a given systemsantos produced for a given concept. For example, 
.088 + .048 + .048 + .02 + .014 + .014 + .014 = .246 for the seven unique non-
categorical word association pairs assigned to the nonverbal/simulationsantos 
system produced for 'walnut'. Then, we summed the FSGs of unique categorical 
word association pairs assigned to that same systemsantos produced for that same 
concept, and divided this value by two (i.e., to reflect partial dependence on each 
system, as per section 2.2.2). For example, (.204 + .17 + .095 + .041 + .02 + 
.014 + .014 + .014) / 2 = .286 for the eight unique categorical word association 
pairs assigned to the nonverbal/simulationsantos system produced for 'walnut'. 
Finally, we summed the non-categorical and categorical summed FSGs. For 
example, .246 plus .286 equals .532, indicating that 53.2% of participants 
produced word association pairs assigned to the nonverbal/simulationsantos 
system for 'walnut' (in short, 53.2% of participants produced 
nonverbal/simulationsantos word association pairs for 'walnut'). 
Note that while we refer to our second dependent variable as "the proportion of 
participants...", it is more accurately an "estimation of the proportion of 
participants...". This is because it excludes FSGs for idiosyncratic word 
association pairs in its calculation, which if included may increase its value. 
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Admittedly, analyses conducted on proportions that consider FSGs of 
idiosyncratic word association pairs may offer different results than what we 
present. This is especially the case for analyses that compare across concept 
types, because proportions of participants who produced non-idiosyncratic word 
association pairs were, on average, smaller for very abstract (M = .745, SE = 
.011) and abstract (M = .766, SE = .015) concepts than for concrete concepts (M 
= .871, SE = .011). 
We include both of these dependent variables, rather than one or the other, 
because it is unknown which is a more accurate approximation of conceptual 
representation (be that in general or with respect to a specific class, system, or 
type of relation). It is sensible to assume that a word association pair produced 
by a large number of participants lends greater insight into how a concept is 
represented than does a word association pair generated by only a few 
participants. However, there is no assurance that this is actually the case. 
Consider, for example, that fork is a more frequent target for knife than is cut. It is 
hard to imagine that a fork is more central to the meaning of knife than is the act 
of cutting. Deese (1965) provides relevant commentary (albeit in the context of 
data collected from continuous association tasks): 
 ...the concept of associative strength seems misapplied to structures of 
 meaning for individuals. Strength, or more precisely, frequency, has an 
 important meaning when one considers populations of individuals and 
 when one wishes to characterize the general meanings of words existing 
 within that population. A meaning possessed by a single individual ought 
 to have less influence in the description of the generalized meaning for the 
 population than a meaning shared by a number of individuals. For a single 
 individual, however, either a word is part of the associative meaning for 
 another word or it is not. To be sure, meanings will fluctuate both 
 systematically and quasi-randomly in time, but in the determination at any 
 given time either a meaning is there or it is not (Deese, 1965, p. 175). 
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Finally, as a point of reference, we include figures that compare the average 
values of our dependent variables assigned to each class (Figure 4), system 
(Figure 5), and type of relation (Figure 6), for each concept type. 
 
 
 
Figure 4. Average number of unique word association pairs produced for each class (Panel A) and 
average proportion of participants who produced word association pairs for each class (Panel B). 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 5. Average number of unique word association pairs produced by each systemsantos (Panel A) 
and systemintuit (Panel C), and average proportion of participants who produced word association pairs 
using each systemsantos (Panel B) and systemintuit (Panel D). 
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Figure 6. Average number of unique word association pairs produced containing each type of relation 
(Panel A) and average proportion of participants who produced word association pairs containing each 
type of relation (Panel B). 
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CHAPTER 3 
TESTING THE THEORIES 
 
3.1   TESTING DUAL CODING THEORY (DCT) 
3.1.1   HYPOTHESES AND PREDICTIONS 
Dual Coding Theory (Paivio, 1986, 2007) argues that abstract concepts are 
represented in the verbal but not the nonverbal system, whereas concrete 
concepts are represented in both. Based on this idea, we generated the 
predictions shown in Table 3, which are repeated using systemssantos (P1-P8) and 
systemsintuit (P9-P16). These particular predictions were generated because they 
represent the simplest predictions that follow logically from DCT. We avoided, for 
example, the prediction that "larger numbers of unique verbal/linguistic word 
association pairs were produced for very abstract than concrete concepts" 
because, despite its simplicity, it does not follow logically from DCT10. 
Table 3. Predictions based on DCT (P1-P16) 
Prediction #  Prediction 
P1, P9  Larger numbers of unique nonverbal/simulation word association pairs were 
produced for concrete than very abstract concepts. 
P2, P10  Larger numbers of unique nonverbal/simulation word association pairs were 
produced for concrete than abstract concepts. 
P3, P11  Larger numbers of unique verbal/linguistic than nonverbal/simulation word 
association pairs were produced for very abstract concepts. 
P4, P12  Larger numbers of unique verbal/linguistic than nonverbal/simulation word 
association pairs were produced for abstract concepts. 
P5, P13  Larger proportions of participants produced nonverbal/simulation word association 
pairs for concrete than very abstract concepts. 
P6, P14  Larger proportions of participants produced nonverbal/simulation word association 
pairs for concrete than abstract concepts. 
P7, P15  Larger proportions of participants produced verbal/linguistic than 
nonverbal/simulation word association pairs for very abstract concepts. 
P8, P16  Larger proportions of participants produced verbal/linguistic than 
nonverbal/simulation word association pairs for abstract concepts. 
                                            
10 DCT's hypotheses do not imply that abstract concepts receive greater representation in the verbal 
system than do concrete concepts—only that they receive greater representation in the verbal system 
relative to the nonverbal system than do concrete concepts. 
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3.1.2   ANALYSES AND RESULTS 
A 3 (concept type: very abstract, abstract, concrete) x 2 (systemsantos: 
nonverbal/simulationsantos, verbal/linguisticsantos) repeated measures ANOVA was 
conducted using numbers of unique systemsantos word association pairs 
produced. Unrelated to our predictions, we found main effects of systemsantos, 
F(1, 109) = 314.830, p < .001. and concept type, F(2, 109) = 5.393, p = .006. The 
main effect of systemsantos was due to larger numbers of unique 
nonverbal/simulationsantos (M = 11.509) than verbal/linguisticsantos (M = 4.241) 
pairs produced. The main effect of concept type was due to larger numbers of 
unique pairs produced per system for very abstract concepts (M = 8.737) than 
concrete concepts (M = 6.959), TUKEY HSD: p < .01. Related to our predictions, 
we failed to find a systemsantos x concept type interaction, F(2, 109) = 0.486, p = 
.616. This interaction would have signaled the possibility that different numbers 
of unique nonverbal/simulationsantos pairs were produced between at least two 
concept types, consistent with predictions 1 and 2. It would also have signaled 
the possibility that different numbers of unique nonverbal/simulationsantos and 
verbal/linguisticsantos pairs were produced within at least one concept type, 
consistent with predictions 3 and 4. Predictions 1-4 were, therefore, unconfirmed. 
A 3 (concept type) x 2 (systemsantos) repeated measures ANOVA was conducted 
using proportions of participants who produced systemsantos word association 
pairs. Unrelated to our predictions, we found main effects of systemsantos, F(1, 
109) = 176.728, p < .001, and concept type, F(2, 109) = 30.389, p < .001. The 
main effect of systemsantos was due to larger proportions of participants producing 
nonverbal/simulationsantos (M = .540) than verbal/linguisticsantos (M = .254) pairs. 
The main effect of concept type was due to larger proportions of participants 
producing pairs per system for concrete concepts (M = .436) than very abstract 
concepts (M = .373), TUKEY HSD: p < .01, as well as abstract concepts (M = 
.383), TUKEY HSD: p < .01. Related to our predictions, we found a systemsantos x 
concept type interaction, F(2, 109) = 4.961, p = .009. This interaction signaled 
the possibility that proportions of participants who produced 
nonverbal/simulationsantos pairs differed between at least two concept types, 
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consistent with predictions 5 and 6. It also signaled the possibility that 
proportions of participants who produced nonverbal/simulationsantos and 
verbal/linguisticsantos pairs differed within at least one concept type, consistent 
with predictions 7 and 8. Accordingly, TUKEY tests were conducted on the 
interaction. Predictions 5 and 6 were confirmed. Larger proportions of 
participants produced nonverbal/simulationsantos pairs for concrete concepts (M = 
.618) than for both very abstract concepts (M = .473), TUKEY HSD: p < .01, and 
abstract concepts (M = .530), TUKEY HSD: p < .01. Predictions 7 and 8, 
however, were unconfirmed. In fact, larger proportions of participants produced 
nonverbal/simulationsantos than verbal/linguisticsantos pairs for very abstract 
concepts (M = .473 versus M = .272), TUKEY HSD: p < .01, as well as abstract 
concepts (M = .530 versus M = .236), TUKEY HSD: p < .01. 
A 3 (concept type) x 2 (systemintuit) repeated measures ANOVA was conducted 
using numbers of unique systemintuit word association pairs produced. Unrelated 
to our predictions, we found a main effect of systemintuit, F(1, 109) = 4.258, p = 
.041, as well as a previously seen main effect of concept type. The main effect of 
systemintuit was due to larger numbers of unique nonverbal/simulationintuit (M = 
8.429) than verbal/linguisticintuit (M = 7.321) pairs. Related to our predictions, we 
found a systemintuit x concept type interaction, F(2, 109) = 4.265, p = .016. This 
interaction signaled the possibility that different numbers of unique 
nonverbal/simulationintuit word association pairs were produced between at least 
two concept types, consistent with predictions 9 and 10. It also signaled the 
possibility that different numbers of unique nonverbal/simulationintuit and 
verbal/linguisticintuit word association pairs were produced within at least one 
concept type, consistent with predictions 11 and 12. Accordingly, TUKEY tests 
were conducted on the interaction. Predictions 9 and 10 were unconfirmed. It 
was not the case that larger numbers of unique nonverbal/simulationintuit word 
association pairs were produced for concrete concepts (M = 8.189) than for very 
abstract concepts (M = 8.184) or abstract concepts (M = 8.919). Predictions 11 
and 12 were also unconfirmed. It was not the case that larger numbers of unique 
verbal/linguisticintuit than nonverbal/simulationintuit word association pairs were 
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produced for very abstract concepts (M = 9.289 versus M = 8.184) or abstract 
concepts (M = 6.892 versus M = 8.919). 
A 3 (concept type) x 2 (systemintuit) repeated measures ANOVA was conducted 
using proportions of participants who produced systemintuit word association pairs. 
Unrelated to our predictions, we found a main effect of systemintuit, F(1, 109) = 
8.980, p = .003, as well as a previously seen main effect of concept type. The 
main effect of systemintuit was due to larger proportions of participants producing 
nonverbal/simulationintuit (M = .455) than verbal/linguisticintuit (M = .339) word 
association pairs. Related to our predictions, we found a systemintuit x concept 
type interaction, F(2, 109) = 3.417, p = .036. This interaction signaled the 
possibility that proportions of participants who produced nonverbal/simulationintuit 
word association pairs differed between at least two concept types, consistent 
with predictions 13 and 14. It also signaled the possibility that proportions of 
participants who produced nonverbal/simulationintuit and verbal/linguisticintuit word 
association pairs differed within at least one concept type, consistent with 
predictions 15 and 16. Accordingly, TUKEY tests were conducted on the 
interaction. Prediction 13, but not 14, was confirmed. Larger proportions of 
participants produced nonverbal/simulationintuit word association pairs for 
concrete concepts (M = .437) than for very abstract concepts (M = .251), TUKEY 
HSD: p < .01, but not abstract concepts (M = .330). Similarly, prediction 15, but 
not 16, was confirmed. Larger proportions of participants produced 
verbal/linguisticintuit than nonverbal/simulationintuit word association pairs for very 
abstract concepts (M = .494 versus M = .251), TUKEY HSD: p < .01, but not 
abstract concepts (M = .436 versus M = .330). 
 
3.1.3   DISCUSSION 
Table 4 summarizes all of the predictions based on DCT, as well as the state of 
evidence for or against them. None of the predictions tested using numbers of 
unique word association pairs produced were confirmed. In contrast, several of 
the predictions tested using proportions of participants who produced word 
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Table 4. Summary of evidence for DCT predictions (P1-P16) 
Predictions Evidence  Predictions Evidence 
#s of unique pairs (systemsantos) #s of unique pairs (systemintuit) 
P1 NV/S: C > VA No P9 NV/S: C > VA No 
P2 NV/S: C > A No P10 NV/S: C > A No 
P3 VA: V/L > NV/S No P11 VA: V/L > NV/S No 
P4 A: V/L > NV/S  No P12 A: V/L > NV/S  No 
Proportions of participants (systemsantos) Proportions of participants (systemintuit) 
P5 NV/S: C > VA Yes P13 NV/S: C > VA Yes 
P6 NV/S: C > A Yes P14 NV/S: C > A No 
P7 VA: V/L > NV/S Opposite (VA: V/L < NV/S) P15 VA: V/L > NV/S Yes 
P8 A: V/L > NV/S  Opposite (A: V/L < NV/S) P16 A: V/L > NV/S  No 
Note. VA = Very Abstract, A = Abstract, C = Concrete, NV/S = Nonverbal/Simulation, V/L = Verbal/ 
Linguistic 
 
association pairs were confirmed. This discrepancy might indicate that 
proportions of participants who produced word association pairs are more 
sensitive measures of conceptual representation than are numbers of unique 
word association pairs produced. Focusing on proportions of participants, we see 
that several analogous analyses using systemssantos and systemsintuit give 
conflicting results (i.e., P6 and P14, P7 and P15, and P8 and P16). First, 
analyses using systemssantos (P6) revealed that larger proportions of participants 
produced nonverbal/simulation word association pairs for concrete than abstract 
concepts, whereas analyses using systemsintuit (P14) failed to reveal this. 
Second, analyses using systemssantos (P7) revealed that larger proportions of 
participants produced nonverbal/simulation than verbal/linguistic word 
association pairs for very abstract concepts, whereas analyses using systemsintuit 
(P15) revealed the opposite (which was the prediction). Third, analyses using 
systemssantos (P8) revealed that larger proportions of participants produced 
nonverbal/simulation than verbal/linguistic word association pairs for abstract 
concepts, whereas analyses using systemsintuit (P16) failed to reveal this (or the 
opposite, which was the prediction). We offer two explanations for these results. 
The first explanation assumes that systemssantos are accurate in the extent to 
which they assign categorical word association pairs to the verbal/linguistic 
system. In this case, the observed results may be due to predictions 7 and 8 
overlooking the role of mediation processes in DCT (see Paivio, 2007, p. 101-
102). Possibly, that analyses for P7 and P8 revealed significant results in the 
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direction opposite to that expected was due to the following mediation process: 
(1) abstract concept verbal information activates concrete concept verbal 
information (e.g., cue/word: danger ® word: highway), (2) concrete concept 
verbal information activates concrete concept nonverbal information (e.g., word: 
highway ® image: a sign), (3) concrete concept nonverbal information activates 
concrete concept verbal information (e.g., image: a sign ® word: sign), (4) 
concrete concept verbal information initiates a response (e.g., word: sign ® 
target/word: sign). However, cases such as "danger ® sign" appear to be rare in 
our data. Moreover, it is difficult to tell if reaction time findings are consistent with 
this process. Paivio, Clark, Digdon, and Bons (1989) found that it took around 1.1 
seconds for words to be imaged (i.e., for the verbal system to activate the 
nonverbal system and produce a behavioral response). This is less than, for 
example, the 1.6 second average word association reaction time found by 
Wallenhorst (1965)11, and so the mediation process above is not ruled out. 
However, most of the words in Paivio et al. (1989) were object words (i.e., 
concrete). Because starting with concrete words effectively skips step 1, 1.1 
seconds is probably an underestimation of how long the process takes. In reality, 
it might take longer than 1.6 seconds. Finally, whether a mediation process is 
even tenable is unknown. For example, the earlier discussed findings linking 
abstract concepts directly to nonverbal processing (e.g., Wilson-Mendenhall et 
al., 2013; McRae et al., 2017) make such a process redundant. 
The second explanation assumes that systemsintuit are accurate in the extent to 
which they assign categorical word association pairs to the verbal/linguistic 
system. In this case, a real difference between very abstract and abstract 
concept representation may account for the fact that (1) larger proportions of 
participants produced nonverbal/simulationintuit word association pairs for 
concrete than very abstract (P13), but not abstract (P14), concepts, and (2) 
larger proportions of participants produced verbal/linguisticintuit than 
                                            
11 It is also less than Jung's finding of a 1.95 second average for universal concepts, for which no 
description is given but which are contrasted with concrete concepts (M = 1.67 seconds) and 
presumably similar to abstract concepts (Jung, 1969, p. 235). 
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nonverbal/simulationintuit word association pairs for very abstract (P15), but not 
abstract (P16), concepts. This is in line with the two-factor model of abstractness, 
which says that there is a distinction between different types of abstract concepts 
(Wiemer-Hastings et al., 2001). 
 
3.2   TESTING PERCEPTUAL SYMBOL SYSTEMS (PSS) 
3.2.1   HYPOTHESES AND PREDICTIONS 
In contrast to DCT, PSS argues that abstract concepts are represented in a 
nonverbal/simulation system (Barsalou, 1999, 2008). Furthermore, PSS argues 
that the focus in this system might be different for abstract and concrete concepts 
(Barsalou & Wiemer-Hastings, 2005). Simulations related to abstract concepts 
might focus on introspective and setting/event properties of situations, whereas 
those related to concrete concepts might focus on critical objects and their 
properties. Accordingly, we generated the predictions in Table 5, which use 
systemsintuit (P17-18, P22-23) and classes (P19-21, P24-26). In generating these 
predictions, we assumed that simulations of introspective properties and critical 
objects/their properties produced word association pairs from the introspective 
and entity-based classes, respectively. We generated predictions 17, 18, 22, and 
23 because they test the most basic assumption that distinguishes PSS from 
DCT. Note that these predictions used systemsintuit but not systemssantos. This is 
because they address only the nonverbal/simulation system, and systemsintuit 
offer the most conservative definition of this system. Any significant results hold 
for systemssantos.  We generated the rest of our predictions with the goal of 
making within-concept type comparisons to contrast with Barsalou and Wiemer-
Hastings (2005) between-concept type comparisons. This required interpreting 
the term "focus" in a specific way. Now, for simulations related to a given concept 
type (e.g., abstract) to focus on a given property type (e.g., introspective), all that 
was required was that said property type (e.g., introspective) be more important 
to said simulations than at least one other property type (e.g., entity-based). 
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Accordingly, we planned to compare pairs of classes. We left out comparisons 
involving the categorical and lexical classes because we characterize their word 
association pairs as belonging only partly, or else not at all, to the simulation 
system. We also left out comparisons involving the situational class because: (1) 
we wanted to limit our already large number of predictions, and (2) Barsalou and 
Wiemer-Hastings (2005) found setting/event (i.e., situational) properties to 
dominate every concept type, so using them would be unlikely to teach us 
anything new. Therefore, we were left with one comparison per concept type, 
each involving introspective and entity-based classes. 
Table 5. Predictions based on PSS (P17-P26) 
Prediction #  Prediction 
P17  More than zero unique nonverbal/simulation word association pairs were produced for 
very abstract concepts. 
P18  More than zero unique nonverbal/simulation word association pairs were produced for 
abstract concepts. 
P19  Larger numbers of unique introspective than entity-based word association pairs were 
produced for very abstract concepts. 
P20  Larger numbers of unique introspective than entity-based word association pairs were 
produced for abstract concepts. 
P21  Larger numbers of unique entity-based than introspective word association pairs were 
produced for concrete concepts. 
P22  Non-zero proportions of participants produced nonverbal/simulation word association 
pairs for very abstract concepts. 
P23  Non-zero proportions of participants produced nonverbal/simulation word association 
pairs for abstract concepts. 
P24  Larger proportions of participants produced introspective than entity-based word 
association pairs for very abstract concepts. 
P25  Larger proportions of participants produced introspective than entity-based word 
association pairs for abstract concepts. 
P26  Larger proportions of participants produced entity-based than introspective word 
association pairs for concrete concepts. 
 
 
3.2.2   ANALYSES AND RESULTS 
A one-sample t-test was conducted using numbers of unique 
nonverbal/simulationintuit word association pairs for very abstract concepts. 
Prediction 17 was confirmed. More than zero unique nonverbal/simulationintuit 
word association pairs were produced for very abstract concepts (M = 8.184, SE  
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= .672), t(37) = 12.171, p < .001. A one-sample t-test was also conducted on 
numbers of unique nonverbal/simulationintuit word association pairs for abstract 
concepts. Prediction 18 was confirmed. More than zero unique 
nonverbal/simulationintuit word association pairs were produced for abstract 
concepts (M = 8.919, SE = .749), t(36) = 11.912, p < .001. 
A 3 (concept type) x 5 (class: categorical, entity-based, introspective, lexical, 
situational) repeated measures ANOVA was conducted using numbers of unique 
word association pairs produced for each class. Unrelated to our predictions, we 
found a main effect of class, F(4, 436) = 129.767, p < .001, as well as a 
previously seen main effect of concept type. Trends in Panel A of Figure 4 
suggest that the main effect of class was due to multiple differences between 
multiple classes. Related to our predictions, we found a class x concept type 
interaction, F(8, 436) = 18.281, p < .001. This interaction signaled the possibility 
that different numbers of unique introspective and entity-based word association 
pairs were produced within at least one concept type, consistent with predictions 
19-21. Accordingly, TUKEY tests were conducted on the interaction. Predictions 
19 and 20 were confirmed. Larger numbers of unique introspective than entity-
based word association pairs were produced for very abstract concepts (M = 
2.289 versus M = .026), TUKEY HSD: p < .01, as well as abstract concepts (M = 
2.135 versus M = .054), TUKEY HSD: p < .01. Prediction 21 was also confirmed. 
Larger numbers of unique entity-based than introspective words association pairs 
were produced for concrete concepts (M = 3.730 versus M = .730), TUKEY HSD: 
p < .01. 
A one-sample t-test was conducted using proportions of participants who 
produced nonverbal/simulationintuit word association pairs for very abstract 
concepts. Prediction 22 was confirmed. Non-zero proportions of participants 
produced unique nonverbal/simulationintuit word association pairs for very abstract 
concepts (M = .251, SE = .144), t(37) = 10.723, p < .001. A one-sample t-test 
was also conducted using proportions of participants who produced 
nonverbal/simulationintuit word association pairs for abstract concepts. Prediction 
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23 was confirmed. Non-zero proportions of participants produced unique 
nonverbal/simulationintuit word association pairs for abstract concepts (M = .330, 
SE = .213), t(36) = 9.430, p < .001. 
A 3 (concept type) x 5 (class) repeated measures ANOVA was conducted using 
proportions of participants who produced word association pairs for each class. 
Unrelated to our predictions, we found a main effect of class, F(4, 436) = 
101.330, p < .001, as well as a previously seen main effect of concept type. 
Trends in Panel B of Figure 4 suggest that the main effect of class is due to 
multiple differences between multiple classes. Related to our predictions, we 
found a class x concept type interaction, F(8, 436) = 4.233, p < .001. This 
interaction signaled the possibility that different proportions of participants 
produced introspective and entity-based word association pairs within at least 
one concept type, consistent with predictions 24-26. Accordingly, TUKEY tests 
were conducted on the interaction. Predictions 24 and 25 were unconfirmed. It 
was not the case that larger proportions of participants produced introspective 
than entity-based word association pairs for very abstract concepts (M = .067 
versus M = .002) or abstract concepts (M = .075 versus M = .001). However, 
prediction 26 was confirmed. Larger proportions of participants produced entity-
based than introspective word association pairs for concrete concepts (M = .168 
versus M = .061), TUKEY HSD: p < .01. 
 
3.2.3   DISCUSSION 
Table 6 summarizes all of the predictions based on PSS, as well as the state of 
evidence for or against them. 
Table 6. Summary of evidence for PSS predictions (P17-P26) 
Predictions Evidence   Predictions Evidence 
#s of unique pairs (nonverbal/simulationintuit)   Proportions of participants (nonverbal/simulationintuit)  
P17 NV/S: VA > 0 Yes   P22 NV/S: VA > 0 Yes 
P18 NV/S: A > 0 Yes   P23 NV/S: A > 0 Yes 
#s of unique pairs (class)   Proportions of participants (class) 
P19 VA: Intro > Entity Yes   P24 VA: Intro > Entity No 
P20 A: Intro > Entity Yes   P25 A: Intro > Entity No 
P21 C: Entity > Intro Yes   P26 C: Entity > Intro Yes 
Note. VA = Very Abstract, A = Abstract, C = Concrete, NV/S = Nonverbal/Simulation 
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All predictions tested using numbers of unique word association pairs produced 
were confirmed. First, more than zero unique nonverbal/simulationintuit word 
association pairs were produced for very abstract concepts (P17) as well as 
abstract concepts (P18). These results suggest that abstract concepts are indeed 
represented in a nonverbal/simulation system. Second, larger numbers of unique 
introspective than entity-based word association pairs were produced for very 
abstract concepts (P19) as well as abstract concepts (P20). Third, larger 
numbers of unique entity-based than introspective words association pairs were 
produced for concrete concepts (P21). These results suggest that the focus 
within the nonverbal/simulation system is different for abstract and concrete 
concepts, particularly in the manner proposed by PSS. 
By contrast, three of five analyses using proportions of participants who 
produced word association pairs were confirmed. Non-zero proportions of 
participants produced nonverbal/simulationintuit word association pairs for very 
abstract concepts (P22) as well as abstract concepts (P23), providing further 
support to the idea that abstract concepts are represented in a 
nonverbal/simulation system. Also, larger proportions of participants produced 
entity-based than introspective word association pairs for concrete concepts 
(P26). However, it was not the case that larger proportions of participants 
produced introspective than entity-based word association pairs for very abstract 
(P24) or abstract (P25) concepts. 
 
3.3   TESTING LANGUAGE AND SITUATED SIMULATIONS (LASS) 
3.3.1   HYPOTHESES AND PREDICTIONS 
Here we test a claim that is not motivated by the abstract/concrete distinction, but 
may have implications related to it. LASS argues that when cues are words, as is 
the case in word association, the verbal/linguistic system is activated before the 
nonverbal/simulation system. Although we did not have reaction time data to test 
this directly, a suitable proxy in the form of target commonality was available, 
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because "more frequent responses [on word association tasks] are quicker" (i.e., 
Marbe's Law; Schlosberg & Heineman, 1950; see also Cason & Cason, 1925). 
Therefore, we introduced a commonality variable. 
We labeled each of our 1764 unique word association pairs common or 
uncommon. Unique word association pairs were considered common if their 
FSGs were greater than or equal to .022 (i.e., if they were generated by at least 
2.2% of corresponding participants, which for most concepts meant around 3 
participants) and uncommon if not. This criterion was chosen because it split our 
1764 unique word association pairs as equally as possible (i.e., 858 common and 
906 uncommon unique word association pairs). Then, we recalculated numbers 
of unique nonverbal/simulationsantos, verbal/linguisticsantos, nonverbal/ 
simulationintuit, and verbal/linguisticintuit word association pairs using the same 
procedures outlined in 2.2.3, but treating common and uncommon pairs as 
separate sets. For example, three common unique non-categorical and four 
common unique categorical nonverbal/simulationsantos word association pairs 
were produced for 'walnut', so five (i.e., 3 + 4 / 2) common nonverbal/ 
simulationsantos word association pairs were produced for 'walnut'. Similarly, four 
uncommon unique non-categorical and four uncommon unique categorical 
nonverbal/simulationsantos word association pairs were produced for 'walnut', so 
six (i.e., 4 + 4 / 2) uncommon nonverbal/simulationsantos word association pairs 
were produced for 'walnut'. 
In order to test LASS, we generated the predictions shown in Table 7, which are 
repeated for systemssantos (P27) and systemsintuit (P28). In generating these 
predictions, we reasoned that if verbal/linguistic system activation precedes 
nonverbal/simulation system activation when cues are words, we should expect 
the activity of the former compared to the latter to be larger at earlier as 
compared to later time points. In addition to these predictions, but contingent on 
their outcomes, we planned to investigate whether the commonality/time course 
effect interacts with concept type. However, no specific prediction was made in 
this regard. 
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Table 7. Predictions and explorations based on LASS (P27-P28, E1-E2) 
Pred. & Exp. #  Prediction & Exploration 
P27, P28  Differences in numbers of common unique verbal/linguistic and 
nonverbal/simulation word association pairs produced by participants are 
more positive or less negative than difference in numbers of uncommon 
unique verbal/linguistic and nonverbal/simulation word association pairs 
produced by participants. 
E1, E2  Does the commonality/time course effect differ across concept type? (this is 
contingent on finding the effect in P27, P28). 
 
 
3.3.2   ANALYSES AND RESULTS 
A paired-sample t-test was conducted using numbers of unique systemsantos word 
association pairs. The first sample reflected how much more or less active the 
verbal/linguistic system was than the nonverbal/simulation system in producing 
common unique word association pairs. It was obtained by subtracting—on a per 
concept basis—the number of common unique verbal/linguisticsantos from 
nonverbal/simulationsantos word association pairs produced. For example, for 
common unique word association pairs involving 'walnut', this was 1 – 1 = 0, 
indicating that the two systems were equally active. The second sample reflected 
how much more or less active the verbal/linguistic system was than the 
nonverbal/simulation system in producing uncommon unique word association 
pairs. It was obtained by subtracting—on a per concept basis—the number of 
uncommon unique verbal/linguisticsantos from nonverbal/simulationsantos word 
association pairs produced. For example, for uncommon word association pairs 
involving 'walnut', this was 3 – 10 = -7, indicating that the nonverbal/simulation 
system was more active than the verbal/linguistic system. Prediction 27 was 
confirmed. Differences between numbers of unique verbal/linguisticsantos and 
nonverbal/simulationsantos word association pairs were significantly less negative 
among common (M = -3.089, SE = .235) than uncommon (M = -4.179, SE = 
.296) unique word association pairs, t(111) = 3.154, p = .002. Put another way, 
there was an average of 3.089 fewer common unique verbal/linguisticsantos than 
nonverbal/simulationsantos word association pairs, and an average of 4.179 fewer 
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uncommon unique verbal/linguisticsantos than nonverbal/simulationsantos word 
association pairs. 
An analogous paired-sample t-test was conducted using numbers of unique 
systemintuit word association pairs. Prediction 28 was confirmed. Differences 
between numbers of verbal/linguisticintuit and nonverbal/simulationintuit word 
association pairs were significantly more positive among common (M = .321, SE 
= .332) than uncommon (M = -1.429, SE = .361) unique word association pairs, 
t(111) = 4.319, p < .001. Put another way, there was an average of .321 more 
common unique verbal/linguisticintuit than nonverbal/simulationintuit word 
association pairs, and an average of 1.429 fewer uncommon unique 
verbal/linguisticintuit than nonverbal/simulationintuit word association pairs. 
Explorations aimed at determining if the commonality effect differs by concept 
type used data from the above analyses. A 3 (concept type) x 2 (commonality: 
common unique verbal/linguisticsantos minus nonverbal/simulationsantos word 
association pairs, uncommon unique verbal/linguisticsantos minus 
nonverbal/simulationsantos word association pairs) repeated measures ANOVA 
was conducted. No concept x commonality interaction was found, F(2, 109) = 
2.654, p = .075. Therefore, exploration 1 was unconfirmed. An analogous 
ANOVA using systemintuit also revealed no concept x commonality interaction, 
F(2, 109) = 1.608, p = .205. Therefore, exploration 2 was unconfirmed as well. 
Because the FSG value we used to define common versus uncommon pairs was 
selected somewhat arbitrarily (i.e., the only consideration was how equal in size 
the two groups would be), we repeated our analyses using a different FSG value. 
This time, unique word association pairs were considered common if their FSGs 
were greater than or equal to .100 and uncommon if not. Prediction 27 was 
reconfirmed. Differences between numbers of verbal/linguisticsantos and 
nonverbal/simulationsantos unique word association pairs were significantly less 
negative among common (M = -.545, SE = .095) than uncommon (M = -6.723, 
SE = .399) unique word association pairs, t(111) = 15.003, p < .001. Put another 
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way, there was an average of .545 fewer common unique verbal/linguisticsantos 
than nonverbal/simulationsantos word association pairs, and an average of 6.723 
fewer uncommon unique verbal/linguisticsantos than nonverbal/simulationsantos 
word association pairs. Prediction 28 was also reconfirmed. Differences between 
numbers of verbal/linguisticintuit and nonverbal/simulationintuit unique word 
association pairs were significantly more positive among common (M = .411, SE 
= .139) than uncommon (M = -1.518, SE = .523) unique word association pairs, 
t(111) = 3.706, p < .001. Put another way, there was an average of .411 more 
common unique verbal/linguisticintuit than nonverbal/simulationintuit word 
association pairs, and an average of 1.518 fewer uncommon unique 
verbal/linguisticintuit than nonverbal/simulationintuit word association pairs. 
Furthermore, explorations using both systemsantos, F(2, 109) = 1.216, p = .300, 
and systemintuit, F(2, 109) = 1.514, p = .225, once again revealed no interactions 
between the commonality/time course effect and concept type. 
 
3.3.3   DISCUSSION 
Table 8 summarizes the predictions and explorations based on LASS, as well as 
the state of evidence for or against them. 
Table 8. Summary of evidence for LASS predictions (P27, P28) and explorations (E1, E2)  
Predictions & Explorations  Evidence  
COMMON FSG >= 0.022, UNCOMMON FSG < 0.022    
#s of unique pairs (systemsantos)    
P27 Common V/L - Common NV/S > Uncommon V/L - Uncommon NV/S  Yes  
E1 Does the effect from P27 differ across concept type?  No  
#s of unique pairs (systemintuit)    
P28  Common V/L - Common NV/S > Uncommon V/L - Uncommon NV/S  Yes  
E2 Does the effect from P28 differ across concept type?  No  
COMMON FSG >= 0.100, UNCOMMON FSG < 0.100    
#s of unique pairs (systemsantos)    
P27-2 Common V/L - Common NV/S > Uncommon V/L - Uncommon NV/S  Yes  
E1-2 Does the effect from P27 differ across concept type?  No  
#s of unique pairs (systemintuit)    
P28-2 Common V/L - Common NV/S > Uncommon V/L - Uncommon NV/S  Yes  
E2-2 Does the effect from P28 differ across concept type?  No  
Note. V/L = Verbal/Linguistic, NV/S = Nonverbal/Simulation  
 
Prediction 27 was confirmed using two different criteria for word association pair 
commonality. Under the first criterion, an average of 3.089 fewer common unique 
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verbal/linguisticsantos than nonverbal/simulationsantos word association pairs were 
produced, and an average of 4.179 fewer uncommon unique verbal/linguisticsantos 
than nonverbal/simulationsantos word association pairs were produced. Under the 
second criterion, an average of .545 fewer common unique verbal/linguisticsantos 
than nonverbal/simulationsantos word association pairs were produced, and an 
average of 6.723 fewer uncommon unique verbal/linguisticsantos than 
nonverbal/simulationsantos word association pairs were produced. Both of these 
findings indicate that the inferior activity of the verbal/linguistic compared to 
nonverbal/simulation system was less inferior in the production of common as 
compared to uncommon word association pairs. Prediction 28 was also 
confirmed using two different criteria for word association pair commonality. 
Under the first criterion, an average of .321 more common unique 
verbal/linguisticintuit than nonverbal/simulationintuit word association pairs were 
produced, and an average of 1.429 fewer uncommon unique verbal/linguisticintuit 
than nonverbal/simulationintuit word association pairs were produced. Under the 
second criterion, an average of .411 more common unique verbal/linguisticintuit 
than nonverbal/simulationintuit word association pairs were produced, and an 
average of 1.518 fewer uncommon unique verbal/linguisticintuit than 
nonverbal/simulationintuit word association pairs were produced. Both of these 
findings indicate that the verbal/linguistic system was more active than the 
nonverbal/simulation system for common word association pairs, but less active 
for uncommon word association pairs. 
Recalling that more frequent responses are quicker, results from both predictions 
support LASS's claim that the linguistic system is activated before the simulation 
system when cues are words. But, while predictions regarding a 
commonality/time course effect were confirmed, explorations failed to find any 
evidence that the effect is influenced by concept type. Therefore, we found 
evidence for one of LASS's general claims, but failed to find evidence with 
bearing on the abstract/concrete distinction. 
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3.4   TESTING DIFFERENT REPRESENTATIONAL FRAMEWORKS (DRF) 
3.4.1   HYPOTHESES AND PREDICTIONS 
Different Representational Frameworks (Crutch & Warrington, 2005, 2007, 2010) 
argues that "abstract words have a relatively greater dependence than concrete 
words upon representations of semantic association and that concrete words 
have a relatively greater dependence than abstract words upon representations 
of similarity-based information" (Crutch & Warrington, 2010, p. 47). To generate 
and test predictions based on this claim (Table 9), our semantic association and 
semantic similarity measures were made relative to each other on a per concept 
basis. For numbers of unique word association pairs produced, this was 
achieved by dividing each concept's number of unique semantically associated 
word association pairs produced by its number of unique semantically similar 
plus semantically associated word association pairs produced. For example, for 
'walnut', this was 9 / (9 + 6) = 0.600 = relative dependence on semantic 
association based on numbers of unique word association pairs produced. For 
proportions of participants who produced word association pairs, this was 
achieved by dividing each concept's proportion of participants who produced 
semantically associated word association pairs by its proportion of participants 
who produced semantically similar plus semantically associated word association  
Table 9. Predictions based on DRF (P29-P32) 
Prediction #  Prediction 
P29  Relative dependence based on #s of unique pairs: Very abstract concepts have a 
greater relative dependence on semantic association than do concrete concepts « 
Concrete concepts have a greater relative dependence on semantic similarity than do 
very abstract concepts. 
P30  Relative dependence based on #s of unique pairs: Abstract concepts have a greater 
relative dependence on semantic association than do concrete concepts « Concrete 
concepts have a greater relative dependence on semantic similarity than do abstract 
concepts. 
P31  Relative dependence based on proportions of participants: Very abstract concepts 
have a greater relative dependence on semantic association than do concrete 
concepts « Concrete concepts have a greater relative dependence on semantic 
similarity than do very abstract concepts. 
P32  Relative dependence based on proportions of participants: Abstract concepts have a 
greater relative dependence on semantic association than do concrete concepts « 
Concrete concepts have a greater relative dependence on semantic similarity than do 
abstract concepts. 
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pairs. For example, for 'walnut', this was .430 / (.388 + .430) = 0.526 = relative 
dependence on semantic association based on proportions of participants who 
produced word association pairs. With these measures of relative dependence, 
we generated the predictions listed in Table 9, which correspond directly to 
DRF's claims. Note that our measures have been relatively abstracted from their 
original forms at this point. For this reason, we refer to them simply as measures 
of "relative dependence". 
 
3.4.2   ANALYSES AND RESULTS 
A univariate analysis (concept x relative dependence on semantic association) 
was conducted using measures of relative dependence on semantic association 
based on numbers of unique pairs (alternatively, we could have used measures 
of dependence on semantic similarity). A main effect of concept type was found, 
F(2, 109) = 8.038, p = .001. Accordingly, TUKEY tests were conducted on the 
main effect. Contrary to prediction 29, very abstract concepts (M = .659/.341) had 
a smaller/larger relative dependence on semantic association/similarity than did 
concrete concepts (M = .810/.190), TUKEY HSD: p < .01. Contrary to prediction 
30, abstract concepts (M = .739/.261) and concrete concepts (M = .810/.190) did 
not differ in their dependence on semantic association/similarity.  
A univariate analysis (concept x relative dependence on semantic association) 
was conducted using measures of relative dependence on semantic association 
based on proportions of participants (again, we could have used measures of 
dependence on semantic similarity). A main effect of concept type was found, 
F(2, 109) = 10.209, p < .001. Accordingly, TUKEY tests were conducted. 
Contrary to prediction 31, very abstract concepts (M = .555/.445) had a 
smaller/larger relative dependence on semantic association/similarity than did 
concrete concepts (M = .797/.203), TUKEY HSD: p < .01. Contrary to prediction 
32, abstract concepts (M = .695/.305) and concrete concepts (M = .797/.203) did 
not differ in their dependence on semantic association/similarity. 
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3.4.3   DISCUSSION 
Table 10 summarizes the predictions based on DRF, as well as the state of 
evidence for or against them.  
Table 10. Summary of evidence for DRF predictions (P29-P32) 
Predictions  Evidence 
#s of unique pairs (per type of relation)   
P29 SA: VA > C « SS: C > VA  Opposite (SA: VA < C « SS: C < VA) 
P30 SA: A > C « SS: C > A  No 
Proportions of participants (per type of relation)   
P31 SA: VA > C « SS: C > VA  Opposite (SA: VA < C « SS: C < VA) 
P32 SA: A > C « SS: C > A  No 
Note. VA = very abstract, A = abstract, C = concrete, SA = semantically associated, SS = 
semantically similar 
 
None of the predictions were confirmed using either measure of relative 
dependence (i.e., based on numbers of unique word association pairs or 
proportions of participants). In fact, results were opposite to expectations 
whenever very abstract concepts were compared to concrete concepts. That is, 
very abstract concepts relied less rather than more on semantic association than 
did concrete concepts, and by consequence, more rather than less on semantic 
similarity. Figure 7 depicts these relationships, and contrasts them with DRF's 
predicted relationships. 
 
 
Figure 7. Two possible relationships between concreteness and semantic similarity/association 
proposed by DRF (A, B) compared to relationships found in the present study (C1 = relative 
dependence based on numbers of unique pairs, C2 = relative dependence based on proportions of 
participants). Parts of figure recreated from Crutch & Warrington (2010, p .48). Note that y-axes of 
graphs use different scales. Note that L = low, H = high. 
 
The present results provide no support for DRF, and are also difficult to interpret 
in terms of other theories. For example, even if—as Crutch and Warrington 
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(2010) discuss—we equate semantic similarity with a nonverbal system and 
semantic association with a verbal system, the results continue to be elusive. 
 
3.5   ADDITIONAL ANALYSES AND RESULTS 
3.5.1   ADDITIONAL ANALYSES AND RESULTS 
We include here extra results from the TUKEY tests performed on the concept 
type x systemsantos and concept type x systemintuit interactions that were found 
(Table 11), as well as the concept type x class interaction that was found (Table 
12). We save the implications of these results for the General Discussion. 
Table 11. Extra results from TUKEY tests performed on the concept type x systemsantos and concept 
type x systemintuit interactions (note: the two interactions are from separate ANOVAs) 
Condition  Avg. #s of 
pairs  
TUKEY HSD Avg. prop. of 
partic. 
TUKEY HSD 
SANTOS     
Verbal/Linguistic     
 Very Abstract – Abstract - - .272 – .236  1.831 
 Very Abstract – Concrete - - .272 – .253 .966 
 Abstract – Concrete - - .236 – .253 .859 
Nonverbal/Simulation     
 Very Abstract – Abstract - - .473 – .530  2.899 
 Very Abstract – Concrete  - - .473 – .618 **7.373 
 Abstract – Concrete - - .530 – .618 **4.445 
INTUIT     
Verbal/Linguistic     
 Very Abstract – Abstract 9.289 – 6.892  *3.944 .494 – .436  1.713 
 Very Abstract – Concrete 9.289 – 5.730 **5.856 .494 – .434 1.772 
 Abstract – Concrete 6.892 – 5.730 1.899 .436 – .434 .059 
Nonverbal/Simulation     
 Very Abstract – Abstract 8.184 – 8.919  1.209 .251 – .330  2.333 
 Very Abstract – Concrete 8.184 – 8.189 0.008 .251 – .437 **5.492 
 Abstract – Concrete 8.919 – 8.189 1.193 .330 – .437 3.139 
Note. * = p < .05, ** = p < .01 
 
Larger numbers of unique verbal/linguisticintuit word association pairs were 
produced for very abstract than concrete and abstract concepts, with no 
difference between the latter two. By comparison, there was no difference in 
proportions of participants who produced verbal/linguisticintuit word association 
pairs between any of the three concept types. 
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Table 12. Extra results from TUKEY tests performed on the concept type x class interaction 
Condition  Avg. #s of pairs  TUKEY HSD Avg. prop. of partic. TUKEY HSD 
Categorical     
 Very Abstract – Abstract 8.026 – 5.811 **6.077 .443 – .400 1.853 
 Very Abstract – Concrete 8.026 – 4.595 **9.413 .443 – .363 *3.447 
 Abstract – Concrete 5.811 – 4.595 3.314 .400 – .363 1.584 
Entity-based     
 Very Abstract – Abstract .026 – .054 .077 .002 – .001 .043 
 Very Abstract – Concrete .026 – 3.730  **10.163 .002 – .168  **7.152 
 Abstract – Concrete .054 – 3.730 **10.019 .001 – .168 **7.147 
Introspective     
 Very Abstract – Abstract 2.289 – 2.135 .423 .067 – .075 .345 
 Very Abstract – Concrete 2.289 – .730 **4.277 .067 – .061 .259 
 Abstract – Concrete 2.135 – .730 *3.829 .075 – .061 .599 
Lexical     
 Very Abstract – Abstract 1.263 – 1.081 .499 .051 – .036 .646 
 Very Abstract – Concrete 1.263 – 1.135 .351 .051 – .071 .862 
 Abstract – Concrete 1.081 – 1.135 .147 .036 – .071 1.498 
Situational     
 Very Abstract – Abstract 5.868 – 6.730 2.365 .182 – .255 3.145 
 Very Abstract – Concrete 5.868 – 3.730 **5.866 .182 – .208 1.120 
 Abstract – Concrete 6.730 – 3.730 **8.177 .255 – .208 2.012 
Note. * = p < .05, ** = p < .01 
 
Larger numbers of unique categorical word association pairs were produced for 
very abstract than both concrete and abstract concepts. However, there was no 
difference in numbers of unique categorical word association pairs produced for 
abstract and concrete concepts. Furthermore, larger proportions of participants 
produced categorical word association pairs for very abstract than concrete 
concepts. However, there was no difference in proportions of participants who 
produced categorical word association pairs for abstract versus very abstract or 
concrete concepts. 
In addition, larger numbers of unique entity-based word association pairs were 
produced for concrete than both very abstract and abstract concepts, with no 
difference between the latter two. Similarly, larger proportions of participants 
produced unique entity-based word association pairs for concrete than both very 
abstract and abstract concepts, with no difference between the latter two. 
Finally, larger numbers of unique introspective as well as unique situational word 
association pairs were produced for very abstract and abstract concepts than for 
concrete concepts, with no differences between the former two 
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CHAPTER 4 
GENERAL DISCUSSION 
 
4.1   GENERAL DISCUSSION 
4.1.1   REGARDING MAIN RESULTS 
In this thesis, we described and, using word association, tested several theories 
of conceptual representation motivated by the abstract/concrete concept 
distinction (or, where not motivated by it, with potential implications related to it). 
Dual Coding Theory (Paivio, 1986, 2007) argues that abstract concepts are 
represented in a verbal but not a nonverbal system, whereas concrete concepts 
are represented in both. We found no support for this claim using our first 
measure (i.e., "number of unique word association pairs..."), which treated all 
unique word association pairs produced by at least two participants as equally 
indicative of conceptual representation within a given system. By comparison, we 
found mixed support for the claim using our second measure (i.e., "proportion of 
participants..."), which treated unique word association pairs produced by at least 
two participants as more indicative of conceptual representation within a given 
system if produced by more participants. In the case of our second measure, we 
found two different patterns of results depending on how we assigned word 
association pairs to the verbal/linguistic and nonverbal/simulation systems. 
When categorical word association pairs were assigned in equal proportion to the 
verbal and nonverbal system, larger proportions of participants produced 
nonverbal/simulation word association pairs for concrete than either very abstract 
or abstract concepts. This points to concrete concepts having greater 
representation in the nonverbal system than either very abstract or abstract 
concepts. Therefore, like some of the neuroanatomical studies discussed in the 
introduction (e.g., Holcomb, 1999), our study provides at least some evidence 
that concrete concepts share a privileged relationship with nonverbal processes. 
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Worth noting is that Marques and Nunes (2012) found no difference in 
proportions of sensorimotor-based (i.e., nonverbal/simulation) word association 
pairs produced for abstract and concrete concepts. One possible reason for this 
is that they chose not to include their taxonomic (i.e., categorical) word 
association pairs as part of either of their systems. This might have led them to 
underestimate numbers of sensorimotor-based (i.e., nonverbal/simulation) word 
association pairs produced for concrete concepts. 
Another finding based on equal assignment of word association pairs to the 
verbal and nonverbal system was that larger proportions of participants produced 
nonverbal/simulation than verbal/linguistic word association pairs for very 
abstract and abstract concepts. This points to very abstract and abstract 
concepts having greater representation in the nonverbal than verbal system, 
which is clearly at odds with DCT's proposed asymmetry. Nevertheless, DCT is 
able to accommodate these findings because it allows for referential connections 
between its two systems (Paivio, 1986, p. 58, 2007, p. 101-102). Hypothetically, 
very abstract and abstract concepts may have generated nonverbal word 
association pairs through a verbal system intermediary. This finding also 
contradicts Marques and Nunes (2012) finding in which larger proportions of 
language-based (i.e., verbal/linguistic) than sensorimotor-based (i.e., 
nonverbal/simulation) word association pairs were produced for abstract 
concepts. Again, their choice to ignore taxonomic (i.e., categorical) word 
association pairs may be responsible for our differing results. 
When categorical word association pairs were assigned solely to the 
verbal/linguistic system, larger proportions of participants produced 
nonverbal/simulation word association pairs for concrete than very abstract but 
not abstract concepts. This points to concrete concepts having greater 
representation in the nonverbal system than very abstract, but not abstract, 
concepts, which provides mixed support for DCT. Comparably, larger proportions 
of participants produced verbal/linguistic than nonverbal/simulation word 
association pairs for very abstract, but not abstract, concepts. This also points to 
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very abstract, but not abstract, concepts having greater representation in the 
verbal than nonverbal system, which again provides mixed support for DCT. The 
pattern of results here also lends support to the two-factor model of abstractness, 
which says that not only is there a distinction between abstract and concrete 
concepts, but also between different types of abstract concepts (Wiemer-
Hastings et al., 2001). It appears there are at least two types of abstract 
concepts, and that the more abstract type has greater representation in the 
verbal system. Direct comparisons between very abstract and abstract concepts 
support this idea. In our extra analyses, we found that larger numbers of unique 
verbal/linguisticintuit word association pairs were produced for very abstract than 
abstract concepts. Furthermore, we found that larger numbers of unique 
categorical word association pairs were produced for very abstract than abstract 
concepts, implying that the categorical aspect of the verbal/linguistic system is 
what really separates very abstract from abstract concepts. 
Perceptual Symbol Systems (Barsalou, 1999, 2008) argues that abstract 
concepts are represented nonverbally, particularly in a simulation system. We 
found strong support for this claim using both of our measures. Significantly more 
than zero unique nonverbal/simulation word association pairs were produced for 
very abstract and abstract concepts. Furthermore, proportions of participants 
significantly larger than zero produced nonverbal/simulation word association 
pairs for very abstract and abstract concepts. Both of these results suggest that 
very abstract and abstract concepts are, indeed, represented in the simulation 
system. Putting aside the possibility of referential connections between systems, 
both results also oppose DCT's claim that abstract concepts are not represented 
in the nonverbal system.  
PSS suggests also that the focus in the simulation system might be different for 
abstract and concrete concepts (Barsalou & Wiemer-Hastings, 2005). 
Simulations related to abstract concepts might focus on introspective and 
setting/event properties of situations, whereas those related to concrete concepts 
might focus on critical objects and their properties. We found strong support for 
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these claims using our first measure. Larger numbers of unique introspective 
than entity-based word association pairs were produced for very abstract and 
abstract concepts. Furthermore, larger numbers of unique entity-based than 
introspective word association pairs were produced for concrete concepts. These 
findings are in general agreement with between-concept type findings from 
Barsalou and Wiemer-Hastings (2005) and Wiemer-Hastings and Xu (2005). By 
comparison, we found mixed support for PSS's claims using our second 
measure. As predicted, larger proportions of participants produced entity-based 
than introspective word association pairs for concrete concepts. However, it was 
not the case that larger proportions of participants produced introspective than 
entity-based word association pairs for very abstract or abstract concepts. 
Presumably, this was due to a floor effect, as proportions of participants who 
produced introspective as well as entity-based word association pairs for very 
abstract and abstract concepts were relatively small. 
Language and Situated Simulations (Barsalou et al., 2008) argues that when 
cues are words, the verbal/linguistic system is activated before the 
nonverbal/simulation system. We found strong support for this claim using our 
first measure (which is the only measure we used to test LASS). Regardless of 
how we assigned word association pairs to the verbal/linguistic and 
nonverbal/simulation systems, differences in numbers of quickly-produced 
unique verbal/linguistic and nonverbal/simulation word association pairs were 
greater than differences in numbers of slowly-produced unique verbal/linguistic 
and nonverbal/simulation word association pairs. This points to linguistic system 
activation preceding simulation system activation when cues are words, as 
proposed by LASS and first supported by Santos et al. (2011). 
Different Representational Frameworks (Crutch & Warrington, 2005, 2007, 2010) 
argues that "abstract words have a relatively greater dependence than concrete 
words upon representations of semantic association and that concrete words 
have a relatively greater dependence than abstract words upon representations 
of similarity-based information" (Crutch & Warrington, 2010, p. 47). In order to 
  
58 
test this claim, we converted our two measures into measures of relative 
dependence on semantic association/semantic similarity. Regardless of which of 
our two converted measures was used, we found semantic similarity to be more 
important to very abstract than concrete concepts—in direct contradiction to 
DRF. Consequently, we found semantic association to be more important to 
concrete than very abstract concepts. These results mirror results from Marques 
and Nunes (2012), and add to a growing list of studies that have been unable to 
replicate findings from Crutch and Warrington (2005, 2007, 2010). 
 
4.1.2   REGARDING ADDITIONAL RESULTS 
Outside of our predictions, we found several more relevant results. When 
categorical word association pairs were assigned solely to the verbal/linguistic 
system, larger numbers of unique verbal/linguistic word association pairs were 
produced for very abstract than concrete concepts. This echoes Marques and 
Nunes' (2012) finding in which larger proportions of language-based (i.e., 
verbal/linguistic) word association pairs were produced for abstract than concrete 
concepts. However, we hesitate to interpret our finding as direct support for DCT. 
DCT argues that abstract concepts are represented in the verbal but not the 
nonverbal system, whereas concrete concepts are represented in both. It does 
not necessarily follow that larger numbers of unique verbal/linguistic word 
association pairs should be produced for very abstract than for concrete 
concepts. In fact, larger numbers of unique verbal/linguistic word association 
pairs could be produced for very abstract than for concrete concepts, and at the 
same time, very abstract concepts could be relatively more dependent on the 
nonverbal system than concrete concepts—in direct contradiction to DCT. This 
might be the case if, for example, the average number of unique verbal/linguistic 
versus nonverbal/simulation word association pairs for very abstract concepts is 
10 versus 20, respectively, and for concrete concepts is 5 versus 5, respectively. 
Admittedly, this is an extremely contrived example. In our study, these values for 
very abstract concepts were 9.289 versus 8.184, respectively, and for concrete 
concepts, they were 5.730 versus 8.189, respectively. Nevertheless, it is 
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unknown if, relative to nonverbal/simulationintuit word association pairs, larger 
numbers of unique verbal/linguisticintuit pairs were produced for very abstract than 
concrete concepts. Worth noting is that similar arguments may be applied against 
our own predictions, such as the prediction that "larger numbers of unique 
nonverbal/simulationintuit word association pairs were produced for concrete than 
very abstract concepts". Larger numbers of unique nonverbal/simulation word 
association pairs could be produced for concrete than very abstract concepts, 
and at the same time, concrete concepts could be more relatively more 
dependent on the verbal system than very abstract concepts. However, because 
DCT explicitly claims that abstract concepts have no representation in the 
nonverbal system, whereas concrete concepts do, we feel our prediction was 
justified from an a priori perspective.  
Larger numbers of unique categorical word association pairs were produced for 
very abstract than concrete concepts. Furthermore, larger proportions of 
participants produced categorical word association pairs for very abstract than 
concrete concepts. Because numbers of unique lexical word association pairs as 
well as proportions of participants who produced them did not differ between 
concept types, these findings suggest that the categorical class was responsible 
for the abovementioned finding involving verbal/linguistic system differences 
between very abstract and concrete concepts. This is especially noteworthy 
because Marques and Nunes (2012) did not include categorical (i.e., 
taxonomical) word association pairs as part of their language-based (i.e., 
verbal/linguistic) system. Therefore, while we get comparable results, we appear 
to get them for different reasons. 
When categorical word association pairs were assigned solely to the 
verbal/linguistic system, larger numbers of unique verbal/linguistic word 
association pairs were produced for very abstract than abstract concepts. 
Additionally, there was no difference in numbers of unique verbal/linguistic word 
association pairs produced for abstract and concrete concepts. Taken together, 
these results suggest—in line with the two-factor model of abstractness (Wiemer-
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Hastings et al., 2001)—that there are two types of abstract concepts, and that 
they are represented in the verbal/linguistic system to differing extents. 
Larger numbers of unique categorical word association pairs were produced for 
very abstract than abstract concepts. Additionally, there was no difference in 
numbers of unique categorical word association pairs produced for abstract and 
concrete concepts. Because numbers of unique lexical word association pairs did 
not differ across concept types, these findings suggest that the categorical class 
was responsible for the abovementioned finding involving verbal/linguistic system 
differences between very abstract and abstract concepts. Note also that we 
found no difference in numbers of unique introspective word association pairs 
produced or proportions of participants who produced them for very abstract and 
abstract concepts. This opposes earlier work showing that abstract concepts 
differ among each other according to the amount of introspective information they 
contain (Wiemer-Hastings et al., 2001). 
Larger numbers of unique entity-based word association pairs were produced for 
concrete than both very abstract and abstract concepts. Furthermore, larger 
proportions of participants produced entity-based word association pairs for 
concrete than either very abstract or abstract concepts. This is in general 
agreement with Barsalou and Wiemer-Hastings (2005) finding that, relative to 
other types of properties, concrete concepts rely on entity properties more than 
do abstract concepts. However, we hesitate to interpret our finding as direct 
support for PSS. PSS argues that simulations related to abstract concepts might 
focus on introspective and setting/event properties of situations, whereas those 
related to concrete concepts might focus on critical objects and their properties. It 
does not necessarily follow that larger numbers of unique entity-based word 
association pairs should be produced for concrete than very abstract or abstract 
concepts. In fact, larger numbers of unique entity-based pairs could be produced 
for concrete than very abstract or abstract concepts, and at the same time, 
concrete concepts could focus less on them. This might be the case if, for 
example, the average number of unique entity-based word association pairs 
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versus all other word association pairs for concrete concepts is 6 versus 30, 
respectively, and for very abstract concepts is 5 versus 5, respectively. 
Admittedly, this is an extremely contrived example. In our study, these values for 
concrete concepts were 3.730 versus 10.190, respectively, and for very abstract 
concepts, they were 0.026 versus 17.446, respectively. These values bode well 
for PSS, but formal analysis is still required to determine if, relative to all other 
unique word association pairs, significantly larger numbers of unique entity-
based word association pairs were produced for concrete than for very abstract 
concepts. 
Larger numbers of unique situational word association pairs were produced for 
very abstract and abstract concepts than for concrete concepts. This is in general 
agreement with Barsalou and Wiemer-Hastings (2005) finding that, relative to 
other types of properties, abstract concepts rely on setting/event properties more 
than do concrete concepts. For reasons similar to those outlined above, we 
hesitate to interpret this finding as direct support for PSS. 
Finally, larger numbers of unique introspective word association pairs were 
produced for very abstract and abstract concepts than for concrete concepts. 
This is consistent with abstract concepts being more emotionally valenced than 
concrete concepts (Kousta et al., 2011). 
 
4.1.3   LIMITATIONS AND FUTURE WORK 
The present study includes several limitations. The first is that it does not control 
for frequency and familiarity ratings, which introduces a potential confound. 
Chaffin (1997) found that, among semantic word association pairs12, high-
frequency/familiarity concepts (i.e., stimulus words) tend to produce event-based 
(comparable to our situational) word association pairs, whereas low-
frequency/familiarity concepts tend to produce definitional (comparable to our 
categorical) word association pairs. Because our very abstract and abstract 
                                            
12 Comparable to all word association pairs in our study excluding lexical pairs. 
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concepts were more frequent and familiar than our concrete concepts, and 
because larger numbers of unique situational word association pairs were 
produced for them, there is a degree of overlap between Chaffin's results and 
ours, at the high end. However, in our defense, our concrete concepts and two 
sets of abstract concepts may not have been different enough to reproduce 
Chaffin's finding. The difference in familiarity between our concrete concepts and 
our two sets of abstract concepts was small; approximately 20 to 30 on a 700-
point scale. In addition, all three concepts types had in common the fact that they 
produced generally high ratings. In fact, the least familiar words used in our study 
were canoe and saxophone. Note that this may also be the reason why we did 
not replicate Chaffin's results for low-frequency/familiarity concepts. 
The second limitation is that we do not control for part of speech across concept 
types. It is known that word association cues tend to evoke targets from their own 
grammatical class (Deese, 1965, p. 103). For example, nouns tend to evoke 
nouns, and verbs tend to evoke verbs. It is conceivable, then, that some of our 
results were driven not by differences in concept type, but rather part of speech. 
Consider, for example, the likely scenario that entity-based targets are more 
often nouns than are other targets. Because our concrete concepts were almost 
universally nouns whereas our very abstract and abstract concepts were around 
40% nouns, findings such as "larger proportions of participants produced 
nonverbal/simulation [largely entity-based] word association pairs for concrete 
than very abstract concepts" could be due to nouns evoking nouns, rather than 
greater representation in the nonverbal/simulation system for concrete than very 
abstract concepts. 
The third limitation is that all assignments of word association pairs to classes 
were ultimately up to the discretion of a single coder. Although, the coder 
attempted to avoid systematic bias of any sort in their assignments, and although 
assignments were influenced by the initial two coders, it would be preferable to 
have multiple coders in this role. Having multiple coders also enables the 
calculation of inter-coder reliability. 
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The final limitation is that the study does not directly address DCT's proposal 
regarding referential connections between its systems. Doing so may have given 
us insight into the validity of our two measures. For example, if no evidence was 
found in support of referential connections, results for predictions 7 and 8 would 
be more difficult to explain using DCT (recall, these results showed that larger 
numbers of unique nonverbal/simulation than verbal/linguistic system word 
association pairs were produced for very abstract and abstract concepts—
opposite to expectations). Consequently, we might favor the intuition-based over 
Santos-based characterization of systems, but more importantly, our first 
measure over our second measure. 
Future work should focus on addressing the major limitations we have outlined. 
That is, it should: (1) control for frequency and familiarity ratings across concept 
types, (2) control for part of speech across concept types, (3) rely on multiple 
coders for final assignments of word association pairs to classes, and (4) 
examine more directly the potential role of referential connections between DCT's 
systems.  
Regarding the fourth limitation, one option is to examine reaction times for 
nonverbal/simulation word association pairs for very abstract and abstract versus 
concrete concepts. If referential connections are involved, very abstract and 
abstract concepts are likely to produce nonverbal/simulation word association 
pairs in the following manner: (1) abstract concept verbal information activates 
concrete concept verbal information (e.g., cue/word: danger ® word: highway), 
(2) concrete concept verbal information activates concrete concept nonverbal 
information (e.g., word: highway ® image: a sign), (3) concrete concept 
nonverbal information activates concrete concept verbal information (e.g., image: 
a sign ® word: sign), (4) concrete concept verbal information initiates a response 
(e.g., word: sign ® target/word: sign). By comparison, concrete concepts are 
likely to produce nonverbal/simulation word association pairs in this manner: (1) 
concrete concept verbal information activates concrete concept nonverbal 
information (e.g., cue/word: balloon ® image: sky), (2) concrete concept 
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nonverbal information activates concrete concept verbal information (e.g., image: 
sky ® word: sky), (3) concrete concept verbal information initiates a response 
(e.g., word: sky ® target/word: sky). Based on the steps involved in these two 
routes, a fair assumption is that individuals are faster at producing 
nonverbal/simulation word association pairs for concrete than very abstract and 
abstract concepts13. Note that the data from the present study could, in theory, 
be used to examine this idea. For example, we might compare the proportion of 
common to uncommon unique nonverbal/simulation word association pairs for 
very abstract concepts to the proportion for concrete concepts. Of course, actual 
reaction times are preferable. 
 
4.1.4   CONCLUSION 
Taken as a whole, our results point to DRF as an untenable theory of abstract 
and concrete concept representation. However, they do little to arbitrate among 
DCT and PSS. The reason for this is that our two measures produce largely 
contrasting results. However, if we assume that our first measure is a better 
estimation of conceptual representation—as Deese might be inclined to do 
(1965, p. 175)—a clearer picture emerges. In this picture, we find that PSS is 
strongly supported by our results. By contrast, DCT is almost universally 
unsupported by them. Of course, this is mere speculation. If we choose to 
speculate instead on behalf of our second measure, we reach conclusions that 
could be interpreted as more favorable to DCT. 
Finally, we might remark on the novelty of this study. While earlier studies have 
used word association to test theories motivated by the abstract/concrete 
distinction, ours is the first study use word association and: (1) find evidence for 
DCT's claim that concrete concepts are represented in the nonverbal system to a 
greater extent than are abstract concepts (i.e., predictions 5, 6, and 13); (2) find 
                                            
13 Note that participants are faster at generating word association pairs for concrete than abstract 
concepts in general (de Groot, 1989). It is possible, then, that between-concept type differences in 
reaction time for nonverbal/simulation word association pairs drive this effect. 
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evidence in total opposition to DCT's above claim (i.e., predictions 7 and 8); (3) 
test and find evidence for PSS's claim that simulations related to abstract 
concepts focus on introspective properties (i.e., predictions 19 and 20); (4) test 
and find evidence for PSS's claim that simulations related to concrete concepts 
focus on entity-based properties (i.e., predictions 21 and 26); (5) test and find 
evidence for LASS's claim that linguistic system activity precedes simulation 
system activity when cues are words (i.e., predictions 27 and 28); (6) find 
evidence for the two-factor model of abstractness (Wiemer-Hastings et al., 2001); 
and (7) find evidence for the claim that abstract concepts are more emotionally 
valenced than concrete concepts (Kousta et al., 2011). 
 
4.2   SUMMARY 
In this thesis, we described and, using word association, tested several theories 
of conceptual representation motivated by the abstract/concrete concept 
distinction (or, where not motivated by it, with potential implications related to it). 
These included Dual Coding Theory (Paivio, 1986, 2007), Perceptual Symbol 
Systems (Barsalou, 1999, 2008), Language and Situated Simulations (Barsalou 
et al., 2008), and Different Representational Frameworks (Crutch & Warrington, 
2005, 2007, 2010). We found mixed support for Dual Coding Theory and 
Perceptual Symbol Systems, strong support for Language and Situated 
Simulations, and no support for Different Representational Frameworks. 
It is our hope that future investigations will benefit from the protocols laid out in 
this thesis, which demonstrate how the abstract/concrete concept distinction can 
be studied using word association. 
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APPENDICES 
Appendix A. Very abstract, abstract, and concrete concepts 
VERY ABSTRACT 
Ability 
Anxious 
Awkward 
Blame 
Bored 
Challenge 
Chance 
Concept 
Depressed 
Eager 
Easy 
Effect 
Genuine 
Gone 
Guilt 
Hope 
Impossible 
Independent 
Instance 
Justify 
Know 
Logic 
Luck 
Manner 
Must 
Nervous 
Opinion 
Other 
Polite 
Proud 
Purpose 
Reality 
Regret 
Unfair 
Unique 
Unknown 
Vague 
Value 
ABSTRACT 
Advice 
Afraid 
Allow 
Angry 
Brave 
Cause 
Confidence 
Crisis 
Danger 
Dare 
Definition 
Excited 
Extra 
Fear 
Freedom 
Friendship 
Habit 
Happy 
Here 
Hesitate 
Ignore 
Join 
Lazy 
Less 
Lonely 
Mad 
Memory 
Missing 
More 
Neglect 
Panic 
Quality 
Relief 
Sad 
Safety 
Same 
Surprise 
CONCRETE 
Ant 
Apple 
Balloon 
Bed 
Boot 
Canoe 
Cheese 
Cherry 
Climb 
Clock 
Cream 
Cucumber 
Dolphin 
Drum 
Eagle 
Elephant 
Garlic 
Gown 
Hammer 
Jacket 
Knife 
Pencil 
Piano 
Pickle 
Pig 
Pliers 
Raccoon 
Robin 
Saw 
Saxophone 
Screwdriver 
Stove 
Tangerine 
Telephone 
Turtle 
Violin 
Walnut 
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Appendix B. Data profile for an example concept, 'walnut' 
 
type 
concept/ 
cue 
 
target 
group 
size 
# of  
partic. 
 
FSG 
sub- 
class 
 
class 
system 
santos 
system 
intuit 
type of 
relation 
concrete walnut peanut 147 30 .204 c-coord categorical both V/L similar 
concrete walnut nut 147 25 .170 c-super categorical both V/L assoc. 
concrete walnut pecan 147 14 .095 c-coord categorical both V/L similar 
concrete walnut tree 147 13 .088 s-loc situational NV/S NV/S assoc. 
concrete walnut crack 147 7 .048 s-action situational NV/S NV/S assoc. 
concrete walnut squirrel 147 7 .048 s-living situational NV/S NV/S assoc. 
concrete walnut almond 147 6 .041 c-coord categorical both V/L similar 
concrete walnut chestnut 147 3 .020 c-coord categorical both V/L similar 
concrete walnut shell 147 3 .020 e-excomp entity-based NV/S NV/S assoc. 
concrete walnut acorn 147 2 .014 c-coord categorical both V/L similar 
concrete walnut brown 147 2 .014 e-exsurf entity-based NV/S NV/S assoc. 
concrete walnut cookie 147 2 .014 e-whole entity-based NV/S NV/S assoc. 
concrete walnut eat 147 2 .014 s-action situational NV/S NV/S assoc. 
concrete walnut food 147 2 .014 c-ont categorical both V/L assoc. 
concrete walnut peas 147 2 .014 c-coord categorical both V/L similar 
 
 # OF UNIQUE PAIRS   PROP. OF PARTIC. 
CLASS     
Categorical 8   .572 
Entity-based 3   .048 
Introspective 0   .000 
Lexical 0   .000 
Situational 4   .198 
 
SYSTEMsantos 
    
Nonverbal/Simulationsantos 11   .532 
Verbal/Linguisticsantos 4   .286 
 
SYSTEMintuit 
    
Nonverbal/Simulationintuit 7   .572 
Verbal/Linguisticintuit 8   .246 
 
TYPE OF RELATION 
    
Semantically similar 6   .388 
Semantically associated 9   .430 
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Appendix C. Scheme modified from Wu & Barsalou (2009) 
CATEGORICAL (C) 
A category in the taxonomy to which a concept belongs. 
¡ SYNONYM (C-SYN) – A synonym of a concept (e.g., car-automobile, cat-
feline, humiliate-embarrass). 
¡ ANTONYM (C-ANT) – An antonym of a concept (e.g., ability-inability, absent-
present). 
¡ SIMILAR CONCEPT (C-SIM) – A concept with a similar meaning that is not 
actually a synonym (e.g., hot-warm, abduct-steal, ignore-leave). 
¡ ONTOLOGICAL CATEGORY (C-ONT) – A category for a basic kind of thing in 
existence, including thing, substance, object, human, animal, plant, location, 
time, activity, event, action, state, thought, emotion (e.g., cat-animal, computer-
object). 
¡ SUPERORDINATE (C-SUPER) – A category one level above a concept in a 
taxonomy (e.g., car-vehicle, apple-fruit, guilt-feeling). 
¡ COORDINATE (C-COORD) – Another category in the superordinate category 
to which a concept belongs (e.g., apple-orange, oak-elm). 
¡ SUBORDINATE (C-SUBORD) – A category one level below the target concept 
in a taxonomy (e.g., chair-rocking chair, frog-tree frog, habit-smoking). 
¡ SUBTYPE (C-TYPE) – A type of a concept that is neither strictly a subordinate 
nor an instance (e.g., ability-physical). 
¡ INDIVIDUAL (C-INDIV) – A specific instance of a concept (e.g., car-my car, 
house-my parents’ house, awkward-me). 
 
ENTITY-BASED (E) 
Properties of a concrete entity, either animate or inanimate. Besides being a 
single self-contained object, an entity can be a coherent collection of objects 
(e.g., forest). 
¡ EXTERNAL COMPONENT (E-EXCOMP) – A three-dimensional component of 
an entity that normally resides on its surface (e.g., car-headlight, tree-leaves). 
¡ INTERNAL COMPONENT (E-INCOMP) – A three-dimensional component of 
an entity that normally resides completely inside the closed surface of the entity 
(e.g., apple-seeds, jacket-lining). 
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¡ EXTERNAL SURFACE PROPERTY (E-EXSURF) – An external property of an 
entity that is not a component, and that is perceived on or beyond the entity's 
surface, including shape, color, pattern, texture, touch, smell, taste, sound, etc. 
(e.g., watermelon-oval, apple-red). 
¡ INTERNAL SURFACE PROPERTY (E-INSURF) – An internal property of an 
entity that is not a component, that is not normally perceived on the entity’s 
exterior surface, and that is only perceived when the entity’s interior surface is 
exposed, includes color, pattern, texture, size, touch, smell, taste, etc. (e.g., 
apple-white, watermelon-juicy). 
¡ SUBSTANCE/MATERIAL (E-MAT) – The material or substance of which 
something is made (e.g., floor-wood, shirt-cloth). 
¡ SPATIAL RELATION (E-SPAT) – A spatial relation between two or more 
properties within an entity, or between an entity and one of its properties (e.g., 
car-window above door, watermelon-green outside). 
¡ SYSTEMIC PROPERTY (E-SYS) – A global systemic property of an entity or 
its parts, including states, conditions, abilities, traits, etc. (e.g., cat-alive, dolphin-
intelligent, car-fast). 
¡ LARGER WHOLE (E-WHOLE) – A whole to which an entity belongs (e.g., 
window-house, apple-tree). 
¡ ENTITY BEHAVIOR (E-BEH) – A chronic behavior of an entity that is 
characteristic of its nature, and that is described as a characteristic property of 
the entity, not as a specific intentional action in a situation (e.g., tree-blows in the 
wind, bird-flies, person-eats). 
¡ ABSTRACT ENTITY PROPERTY (E-ABSTR) – An abstract property of the 
target entity not dependent on a particular situation (e.g., teacher-democrat, 
transplanted californian-buddhist). 
¡ QUANTITY (E-QUANT) – A numerosity, frequency, size, intensity, or typicality 
of an entity or its properties (e.g., jacket-an article of clothing, cat-four legs, tree-
lots of leaves, apple-common fruit, watermelon-usually green, apple-very red). 
 
INTROSPECTIVE (I) 
A property of a subject’s mental state as he or she views a situation, or a 
property of a character’s mental state in a situation. 
¡ AFFECT/EMOTION (I-EMOT) – An affective or emotional state toward the 
situation or one of its components by either the subject or a participant (e.g., 
magic-a sense of excitement, vacation-I was happy, smashed car-anger, panic-
anxiety, nervous). 
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¡ EVALUATION (I-EVAL) – A positive or negative evaluation of a situation or one 
of its components by either the subject or a participant (e.g., apples-I like them, 
vacation-I wrote a stupid paper, crisis-bad). Typically more about the situation or 
component than about the perceiver, often attributing a trait to it (e.g., beautiful, 
common). Use i-emot when the focus is more on the perceiver and on a 
traditional emotional state. 
¡ REPRESENTATIONAL STATE (I-REP) – A relatively static or stable 
representational state in the mind of a situational participant, including beliefs, 
goals, desires, ideas, perceptions, etc. (e.g., smashed car-believed it was not 
working, tree-wanted to cut it down, tree-had a good view of a bird in it). 
¡ COGNITIVE OPERATION (I-COGOP) – An online operation or process on a 
cognitive state, including retrieval, comparison, learning, etc. (e.g., watermelon-I 
remember a picnic, rolled grass-looks like a burrito, car-I learned how to drive). 
¡ CONTINGENCY (I-CONTIN) – A contingency between two or more aspects of 
a situation, including: conditionals and causals, such as if, enable, cause, 
because, becomes, underlies, depends, requires, etc.; correlations such as 
correlated, uncorrelated, negatively correlated, etc.; others including possession 
and means (e.g., car-requires gas, tree-has leaves depending on the type of tree, 
vacation-free from work, magic-I was excited because I got to see the magician 
perform, car-my car). 
¡ NEGATION (I-NEG) – An explicit mention of the absence of something, with 
absence requiring a mental state that represents the opposite (e.g., car-no air 
conditioning, apple-not an orange). 
¡ QUANTITY (I-QUANT) – A numerosity, frequency, intensity, or typicality of an 
introspection or one of its properties (e.g., truth-a set of beliefs, buy-I was very 
angry at the saleswoman, magic-I was quite baffled by the magician). 
 
LEXICAL (L) 
A purely language-based associate. 
¡ MORHPOLOGICAL (L-MORPH) – A form of the word that is not an antonym 
(e.g., hope-hopeful). 
¡ COMPOUND CONTINUATION FORWARD (L-COMPF) – The cue plus 
response is a phrase, with no other plausible relation (e.g., eager-beaver). 
¡ COMPOUND CONTINUATION BACKWARD (L-COMPB) – The cue plus 
response is a phrase in the opposite direction, with no other plausible relation 
(e.g., beaver-eager). 
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SITUATIONAL (S) 
A property of a situation, where a situation typically includes one or more agents, 
at some place and time, engaging in an event, with one or more entities in 
various semantic roles (e.g., picnic, conversation, vacation, meal). 
¡ PERSON (S-PERSON) – An individual person or multiple people in a situation 
(e.g., toy-children, car-passenger, furniture-person, brave-soldier). 
¡ LIVING THING (S-LIVING) – A living thing in a situation that is not a person, 
including other animals and plants (e.g., sofa-cat, park-grass, fear-snake). 
¡ OBJECT (S-OBJECT) – An inanimate object in a situation, except buildings 
(e.g., watermelon-on a plate, cat-scratch sofa, freedom-flag). 
¡ SOCIAL ORGANIZATION (S-SOCORG) – A social institution, a business, or a 
group of people or animals in a situation (e.g., freedom-government, radio-kmart, 
picnic-family, dog-pack, freedom-country). 
¡ SOCIAL ARTIFACT (S-SOCART) – A relatively abstract entity—sometimes 
partially physical (book) and sometimes completely conceptual (verb)—created in 
the context of socio-cultural institutions (e.g., farm-a book (about), farm-a movie 
(about), invention-a group project, (to) carpet-a verb). 
¡ BUILDING (S-BUILD) – A building in a situation (e.g., book-library, candle-
church, guilt-court, safety-home). 
¡ LOCATION (S-LOC) – A place in a situation where an entity can be found, or 
where people engage in an event or activity (e.g., car-in a park, buy-in Paris). 
¡ SPATIAL RELATION (S-SPAT) – A spatial relation between two or more things 
in a situation (e.g., watermelon-the ants crawled across the picnic table, 
vacation-we slept by the fire). 
¡ TIME (S-TIME) – A time period associated with a situation/relationship/internal 
state or with one of its properties (e.g., picnic-fourth of July, sled-during the 
winter, friendship-lasting, forever). When an event is used as a time (e.g., muffin-
breakfast), code the event as s-event. 
¡ ACTION (S-ACTION) – An action (not introspective) that an agent (human or 
non-human) performs intentionally in a situation (e.g., shirt-wear, apple-eat, 
advice-listen). When the action is chronic and/or characteristic of the entity, use 
e-beh. 
¡ EVENT (S-EVENT) – A stand-alone event or activity in a situation where the 
action is not foregrounded but is on a relatively equal par with the setting, agents, 
entities, etc. (e.g., watermelon-picnic, car-trip, church-wedding, surprise-party). 
Use s-action when the action is foregrounded (e.g., use s-action for church-
marry, but use s-event for church-wedding). 
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¡ OUTCOME (S-OUT) – An outcome of an event or internal state (e.g., 
competition-win, crisis-death, humiliate-hurt). 
¡ CAUSE (S-CAUS) – An event/situation/internal state that causes an emotional 
cue word, or is typically associated with it (e.g., stress-work, disappoint-fail).  
¡ MANNER (S-MANNER) – The manner in which an action or event is performed 
in a situation (e.g., watermelon-sloppy eating, car-faster than walking). Or, 
manners/behaviours associated with an internal state (lazy-slow, anxious-jumpy). 
That is the modification of an action in terms of its quantity, duration, style, etc. 
Code the action itself as s-action, s-event, or e-beh. 
¡ FUNCTION (S-FUNC) – A typical goal or role that an entity serves for an agent 
in a situation by virtue of its physical properties with respect to relevant actions 
(e.g., car-transportation, clothing-protection). 
¡ PHYSICAL STATE (S-PHYST) – A physical state of a situation or any of its 
components except entities whose states are coded with e-sys, and social 
organizations whose states are coded with s-socst (e.g., mountains-damp, 
highway-congested). 
¡ SOCIAL STATE (S-SOCST) – A state of a social organization in a situation 
(e.g., family-cooperative, people-free). 
¡ QUANTITY (S-QUANT) – A numerosity, frequency, intensity, or typicality of a 
situation or any of its properties except of an entity, whose quantitative aspects 
are coded with e-quant (e.g., vacation-lasted for eight days, car-a long drive). 
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